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ABSTRACT
Kannan,Subramaniyam MS, Purdue University, August 2018. Mitigating Multi-Stage
Attacks in Software Deﬁned Network-based Distributed Systems. Major Professor:
Saurabh Bagchi.
Multi-layer distributed systems, such as those found in enterprise networks, are
often the target of multi-stage attacks (MSA). In MSA, an attacker compromises
external-facing services and then penetrates progressively into deeper services in a
stepping-stone manner, by using elevated privileges at each system component, until
ﬁnally the attacker gains access to the crown jewel of the system (such as, some protected data). Under such attacks, it is diﬃcult to identify the upstream attacker’s
identity from a downstream victim machine because of the mixing of multiple network ﬂows. This thesis presents TOPHAT, a system that solves such attribution
problems for multi-stage attacks. It does this by using Intrusion Detection Sensors
(IDS) and moving target defense, i.e., shuﬄing the assignment of clients to server
replicas, which is achieved through Software Deﬁned Networks (SDN). Also, limited
resources constrain the number of IDS that can be deployed since IDS processing
can be quite computationally expensive. SDN provides network ﬂexibility, and combined with Network Function Virtualization (NFV), it enables agile optimization for
the IDS placement throughout the distributed system to counter the MSA. Thus,
this work next presents OPTIMISM, a system for placing IDS to maximize network
protection and to minimize total deployment costs while adapting in real time to
updated intrusion information. Using simulation, this thesis shows that TOPHAT
can identify multiple attackers in a variety of systems and OPTIMISM can select
IDS placement conﬁgurations that are signiﬁcantly better than the state-of-the-art

xiii
(Monitor-DSN16). Using a hardware-backed SDN testbed and a distributed onion
application, OPTIMISM’s feasibility is demonstrated.

1

1. INTRODUCTION
1.1

Motivation
Most networked enterprise systems are structured as large-scale distributed sys-

tems with external facing interfaces such as a ﬁle or a web server with business
critical functionality being executed on servers deep inside the network. It is diﬃcult
to protect such systems since the attack can start at any point and propagate in different paths, making the attack surface very large and dynamic. Diﬀerent originating
points, the availability of zero-day attacks and system diversity makes it even more
challenging to defend such systems. The current state of the art technique to protect
such systems is to use devices such as ﬁrewalls [1, 2] or intrusion detection sensors
(IDS) [1,3–7] at ingress and egress points to monitor the traﬃc crossing the perimeter
of the network. Such perimeter based defense strategies are ineﬀective in protecting
distributed systems due to the challenges as follows. Firstly, the perimeter can be
easily breached either by bypassing the system via an internal user or an external
user as there are many diﬀerent starting points and propagating paths. Secondly,
the attack can spread so fast so that a single sensor cannot detect the attacker for
extended period of time.
A common attack model for breaching multi-layer distributed systems are multistage attacks (MSA) [8,9]. Such attacks utilize multiple victim machines, in a series, to
compromise a target asset deep inside the enterprise network. The attacker starts by
compromising an external facing service like web server by exploiting a vulnerability
in it. Then the attacker uses the access privilege on the compromised server to
proceed to rest of the network in a step by step manner until reaching the crown
jewel that contains sensitive information. As discussed before a perimeter based
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defense techniques such as using a single IDS or ﬁrewall can easily be compromised
by route adjustments.
The naı̈ve approach is to use multiple IDS to protect such distributed systems
against MSA. These multiple IDS alerts are useful for ﬁnding single stage attacks
but less useful in the case of MSA because it is challenging to identify the particular
attacker out of the legitimate clients who was responsible for the alert. In other words,
it is diﬃcult to attribute a particular network ﬂow to the corresponding client or
attacker at the entry server or external facing interface due to the mixing of multiple
network ﬂows at the intermediate servers. This problem is called as un-mixing or
attribution problem in the security domain. The ﬁrst problem that this thesis solves
is such kind of attribution problems. This thesis presents Tophat, a novel system
to attribute multi-stage attacks to a single external source without relying on attack
graphs or modifying server software.
Tophat uses the notation of moving target defense (MTD) to solve such attribution problems. Tophat operates by maintaining a risk factor for each connected
client and then modifying the risk factors whenever alerts are generated. The Risk
Factor indicates the probability of that particular client or network ﬂow is actually
an attacker. For each alert generation, the risk factor is increased for all the network
ﬂows associated with the alerting service. The clients are then shuﬄed and assigned
to diﬀerent server replicas based on their risk factor so that over the time, the malicious ﬂows have progressively increasing risk factor. The shuﬄing process resembles
moving target defense (MTD) strategy where the group of clients are moved to a
diﬀerent server whenever an alert is generated. With suﬃcient number of shuﬄes,
the risk factor of the malicious ﬂows exceeds a user-set threshold and the attacker is
identiﬁed or isolated from the legitimate clients. Tophat can easily manipulate and
re-route the network ﬂows to the desired nodes to support MTD style defense with
the help of software deﬁned networks (SDN). SDN provides the much needed routing
ﬂexibility to incorporate the MTD style defense in Tophat.
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Furthermore, Tophat is a system to solve such attribution problems given that
the IDS are placed at the best locations to identify the multi-stage attacks. The next
problem is to determine the best locations or servers in the network that are suitable
for IDS deployment. One may imagine that placing an IDS on every single system
component will provide the greatest visibility to a MSA. However, limited resources
constrain the number of IDS that can be deployed since IDS processing can be quite
computationally expensive. Now, it becomes even more challenging to determine the
optimal IDS placement with a limited budget. Simple IDS placement strategies do
not solve the attribution problem. For instance, an IDS which is not on the path
to the crown jewel has no value while an IDS on a highly utilized network link may
identify majority of attacks directed at the crown jewel. Also, the attackers can
bypass the static IDS deployment after certain trails by changing the attack paths.
Finally this work presents Optimism, a novel system to determine near-optimal and
dynamic IDS placements to identify multi-stage attacks.
Optimism uses software deﬁned networks (SDN) combined with network function
virtualization (NFV) to provide agile optimization for IDS placement throughout the
distributed system to counter MSA. The overall aim of Optimism is to select an IDS
placement conﬁguration such that the probability of attacker reaching the protected
assets is maximally reduced and the corresponding deployment cost is within the
network administrator’s budget. Optimism uses a genetic algorithm to maximize
the beneﬁt function while minimizing the deployment costs. It provides two optimization variants namely cost constrained optimization (CCO) to maximize beneﬁt
while meeting the cost constraints and best value optimization (BVO) to maximize
beneﬁt-to-cost ratio. It also has an online learning system that re-calibrates the original placement when further attacker information becomes available at run time. The
dynamic IDS movement is facilitated by deploying the IDS as a virtualized network
function and updating the routing rules in OpenFlow switches. Finally, Optimism
provides elastic module that increases the number of IDS deployed under times of
attack and reduces the number of IDS during more benign conditions. With Opti-
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mism, network administrators can maximize protection of their crown jewel assets
from MSA while bounding the IDS deployment costs. Overall Tophat combined
with Optimism can mitigate MSA in the software deﬁned network (SDN) based
distributed systems.

1.2

Outline and Contributions
This section summarizes the outline and main contributions of this thesis.

1.2.1

Multi-Stage Attack Attribution

Chapter 2 introduces to Multi-stage attacks and explains the drawbacks of perimeter based defenses. The shortfalls of the existing solutions based on attack graphs
and packet tagging to solve the attribution problems are discussed next. Then the
system model, attacker model and legitimate client model are described in detail with
the assumptions. The following sections in this chapter describe the design details
of Tophat and the implementation of MTD style defense to attribute the attacker.
Tophat provides two variants namely uniform assignment and low risk isolation to
isolate the attacker from legitimate clients. The rest of the chapter discusses about
the experimentation setup and evaluates the performance of Tophat. The main
contributions in this chapter are as follows.
• Developed Tophat that can isolate the multi stage attackers from the legitimate clients without using attack graphs or modifying the server softwares.
• Tophat uses the MTD techniques to signiﬁcantly increase the attacker’s eﬀort.
• Developed uniform assignment variant of Tophat to identify the attacker much
faster at the cost of the legitimate client disruptions.
• Developed low risk isolation variant of Tophat to support high connectivity
for legitimate clients while still identifying the attackers.
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1.2.2

Near-Optimal and Dynamic Intrusion Detection Sensor (IDS) Placement

Chapter 3 starts by motivating the importance of IDS placement and clearly discussing the drawbacks of naive IDS placement strategies. The next section describes
the related work on optimal IDS placements and their short comings in the context
of multi-stage attacks. All the prior works on IDS placement optimization lack dynamism and elasticity. Then the system model, attacker model and defense model are
discussed in detail. The following sections of this chapter describe the design details
of Optimism with two models for low-level optimization namely cost constrained
optimization (CCO) and best value optimization (BVO). The additional subsystems
such as online learning to support dynamic IDS placements and elasticity are also
described in this section. The next section discusses the implementation details of
Optimism in the physical SDN testbed with OpenFlow capable hardware switches.
This section also describes the operation of IDS and explains the deployment of IDS
using NFV. A distributed onion application that mimics the multi-stage attacker
model is described in the following section. The remaining sections in this chapter
describes the experimentation setup and evaluates the performance of Optimism in
both static and dynamic environment. The last experiment in this section demonstrates the SDN testbed setup and evaluates Optimism’s performance in the physical
testbed with open-ﬂow capable hardware switches. The novel contributions in this
chapter are given below.
• Developed Optimism to determine the optimal IDS placement in a multilayered distributed systemm to identify the multi-stage attacks.
• Developed cost constrained optimization (CCO) variant of Optimism to maximize the beneﬁt or minimize the probability of attacker reaching the crown
jewel undetected while meeting the budget constraints.
• Developed best value optimization (BVO) variant of Optimism to maximize
the beneﬁt-to-cost ratio.
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• Incorporated an online learning module to respond to IDS alerts in real time
and dynamically reconﬁgure the IDS placement to maximize beneﬁt.
• Incorporated an elastic module to control the number of IDS deployed in the
short time to maximize beneﬁt while meeting longer term budget constraints.
• Demonstrated the Optimism’s feasibility on a hardware-based SDN testbed
with a distributed onion application.
The chapter 4 concludes the thesis and also provides directions for future work.

1.3

Work Publication
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Networks (Securecomm 2017), pp. 1-22, October 22-24, 2017, Niagara Falls,
Canada.
• ”MAAT: Multi-Stage Attack Attribution in Enterprise Systems using
Software Deﬁned Networks”, Subramaniyam Kannan, Paul Wood, Larry
Deatrick (Northrop Grumman), Patricia Beane (Northrop Grumman), Somali
Chaterji, and Saurabh Bagchi, EAI Endorsed Transactions on Security and
Safety 17(11): e4, pp. 1-14, December 2017.
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Presentations:
• ”Prediction of Attack Consequences and Automatic Network Reconﬁguration as Response” at Northrop Grumman Cybersecurity Research
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2. TOPHAT: TOPOLOGY-BASED HOST-LEVEL
ATTRIBUTION FOR MULTI-STAGE ATTACKS IN
ENTERPRISE SYSTEMS USING SOFTWARE DEFINED
NETWORKS
2.1

Introduction
Multi-stage attacks (MSA) have plagued distributed system administrators for

decades. In these attacks, multiple computers are used simultaneously to breach a
particular target, and attackers often rely on a series of privilege escalation attacks
to circumvent access controls protecting assets. One of the most challenging aspects
of MSA comes as an attribution, mixing, or traceability problem [8, 9]. Defenders
wish to know what particular network traﬃc resulted in a privilege escalation, to
prevent it in the future, but from a network perspective, the traﬃc output at each
stage is not associated with any particular input. Consequently, defenders cannot
distinguish legitimate from malicious network traﬃc, and identifying, patching, or
disrupting vulnerabilities remains a daunting task. This chapter describes Tophat
(TOPology-based Host-level ATtribution), a technique for identifying malicious users
and their network traﬃc.
Multi-stage attacks operate on top of distributed systems where each distributed
layer has diﬀerent access privileges to sensitive business assets. An attacker must
penetrate multiple layers to access some protected information, a crown jewel. As
the attacker progresses, she generates some intrusion alerts due to some traﬃc with a
malicious signature passing through intrusion detection systems (IDS) [10,11]. These
alerts, while useful for ﬁnding single stage attacks, are less useful in the MSA because
the {source,destination} pairs are both machines inside of the distributed system,
instead of an external attributable source (as would be the case for an Internet-
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facing web server, for example). Consequently, there is no obvious relationship between alerts deep in the distributed system and the outsider, and this problem is
referred to as the attribution, traceback or un-mixing problem [8, 12]. In this context, an attributable alert is one which identiﬁes an external source directly, and
an unattributable alert is one which identiﬁes no source or identiﬁes an internal or
intermediate source, which cannot actually be the attacker.
Existing solutions [13–20] to the attribution problem have a few common shortfalls that Tophat addresses. First, solutions such as [13–15,21] rely on attack graphs
to perform alert inferencing, where existing relationships between alerts are known
via expert system knowledge. For example, an expert would claim that a port scanning alert deep in the distributed system follows from a wrong password alert in the
Internet-facing layers. In practice, such relationships are complex, numerous, and
diﬃcult to derive. Furthermore, it is challenging to keep such information updated
because systems are dynamic with new vulnerabilities being discovered, new digital
assets being brought online, and new users being added. Tophat solves this issue
without relying on attack graphs, thus providing a more general, robust, and adaptive
solution to solving the attribution problem. Second, solutions such as [16–19] rely on
causal links between stages or layers of the MSA. For example, inside the system, it
is known that input I1 causes output O1 , and these relationships are logged and analyzed so that network traﬃc can be eﬀectively tagged and tracked in the system. This
approach relies on application support, however, to provide the causal links. Tophat
does not rely on such information from the underlying application and can identify
attackers without this causality link. Benjamin et al. [20] from Google developed a
tracing infrastructure system called as Dapper to monitor the behavior of network
ﬂow in large scale distributed systems. Dapper builds a tree of remote procedural
calls (RPCs) by using message identiﬁers and timestamped events for every message
sent and received at each server. The key disadvantage of this approach is that it requires human intervention to analyze the logged information and decide the response
action. But, since the attacks are in machine time, Tophat is an automated response
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system without any human intervention. Also Dapper can’t be used for third party
applications since the system is restricted to applications that use same threading
model, control ﬂow and RPC system making it less robust.
Tophat is a network-based solution to the attribution problem. The incident
ﬂows from external clients to alert sources are represented in a directed acyclic graph,
where each node in the graph models the mixing property of intermediate servers and
softwares. Some of these ﬂows are malicious, and they generate one or more alerts at
various nodes, and at various depths, on its path. For each alert, I generate and track
partial attribution for all clients that can reach the alerted node as a stateful metric
called risk factor, or equivalently, risk value. Tophat, taking into consideration
current risk for each network ﬂow, adjusts the servers that the ﬂow will pass through,
using a process called shuﬄing [22]. Through the shuﬄing process, Tophat isolates
the suspect ﬂows and keeps adjusting the risk factor. With a suﬃcient number of
shuﬄes, the risk factor of the malicious ﬂows exceeds a user-set threshold, ie, the
cumulative partial attributions for an attacker reaches a level of complete attribution,
and the attacker is identiﬁed1 .
In Tophat, I utilize detection techniques that resemble moving target defenses
(MTD) [23], through my shuﬄing algorithms. Using software deﬁned networks (SDN)
[24], Tophat is able to manipulate or re-route the network ﬂows to desired nodes that
in turn helps in identifying the attacker in the distributed system. Using SDN-based
load balancers [25], entering ﬂows from external clients are mapped to any replica of
an entry-level server in the distributed system. Then, whenever an alert is generated,
by an IDS placed at a replica of any server in the system, some risk is attributed to
all ﬂows that are passing through that server replica. Using two diﬀerent approaches
corresponding to two diﬀerent variants of Tophat, it tracks this risk and assigns
clients so that the malicious ﬂows have progressively increasing risk factor. Finally,
1

Terminology clariﬁcation: In this chapter, I will use the term “attacker” synonymously with “attacking ﬂow” or “malicious ﬂow”. Without loss of generality, I say for ease of exposition, that one
client generates one network ﬂow and thus there is a one-to-one correspondence. In parts of the
chapter, I use the term “client” for “network ﬂow” where such use will not lead to confusion. In
places where I talk of attributing an attack and increasing risk factors, I use the term “client”.
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those with risk values above a user-settable threshold can be isolated, blocked, or
studied in a honey-pot.
Using this approach, Tophat is able to identify a single attacker in a system
of 1000 clients and 3 servers at the entry layer in 6 shuﬄes, requiring 1000 seconds
whenever the attacker repeats the attack for approximately every 150 seconds. In the
same system with 4 attackers, all of the attackers are identiﬁed in 27 shuﬄes. I also
show that the same system with 10 attackers, the shuﬄing mechanism requires the
attacker to repeat their exploits over 1000 times before gaining access to the crown
jewel, thus signiﬁcantly increasing the attacker’s eﬀorts under Tophat. Finally, this
chapter demonstrates how Tophat impacts the legitimate clients, showing that after
3-4 shuﬄes a majority of clients can retain continuous connectivity while the attacker
is still identiﬁed.
The main contributions that I present in this chapter are:
1. Tophat can attribute multi-stage attacks on a distributed system to a single external source, without relying on attack graphs or modifying the server
softwares.
2. The MTD-style defense signiﬁcantly increases attacker’s eﬀort, and can support
identiﬁcation of multiple simultaneous attackers.
3. Tophat can support high availability for legitimate clients while still identifying
attackers in the system.

2.2

Background and Assumptions

2.2.1

System Model

Tophat is designed to protect a distributed system where servers exist at multiple
layers, starting from an external-facing layer (layer 1) to moving progressively within
the periphery of the system. A schematic is shown in Figure 3.1. Each layer comprises
multiple server instances, or synonymously, server replicas, which are used for load
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balancing purposes. Tophat leverages these instances for the purpose of isolating
suspect network ﬂows, as I will detail in Section 2.4. As a running example, I consider
a web-based e-Commerce system operated by a publicly traded company. Normal
clients access a web front end, layer 1, that connects to a database back end, layer 2,
to store orders, interact with inventory, and otherwise manage transactions. In layer
3, a corporate reporting server analyzes the database to create sales reports, track
hot products, and manage inventory at a macro level. It interfaces with the database
layer and stores reports on layer 4, the corporate ﬁle servers. Inside of the corporate
ﬁle server is an upcoming earnings statement for the next quarter (the crown jewel ),
and its early release would allow for insider trading since the company’s performance,
relative to projections, can have a signiﬁcant impact on stock prices. The attacker(s)
wish to ex-ﬁltrate the earnings report. More generally, the protected system may
comprise an arbitrary number of layers and each layer may have none, one, or more
server replicas.

2.2.2

Network Structure

The overall network structure for Tophat is shown in Fig. 3.1. A server type is
each distinct kind of server—web server, ﬁle server, database server, etc. Each server
type has multiple instances in my solution and each layer has servers of one speciﬁc
kind. Each layer is connected to the next via an SDN capable switch and all these
switches are controlled by a centralized SDN controller. The controller, through the
switch, controls all layer-to-layer interaction paths. In SDN, as the control plane is
separated from the data plane [26] it is possible to dynamically route the traﬃc to
the desired servers by updating the ﬂow table in each of the open ﬂow switch. I use
this functionality to route any speciﬁc network traﬃc ﬂow through a speciﬁc set of
server instances, as determined by the algorithm in Tophat.
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Fig. 2.1.: A sample distributed system that can be protected by Tophat. It shows
a multi-layered application and diﬀerent network ﬂows are intermixed at all layers
of the system. Each layer comprises multiple server instances and the connectivity
among layers is provided by SDN-enabled network switches.
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2.2.3

Intrusion Detection Systems

At its core, Tophat relies on intrusion detection systems to provide the alerts
that drive its identiﬁcation techniques. Each server itself has an IDS running (shown
as a ﬁrewall in the Fig. 3.1) so that alerts can be generated due to ongoing attacks.
In today’s deployments, IDS are often placed at the periphery, ie, at layer 1 of the
network, and the alerts are often noisy (false positive) due to the wide variety of
traﬃc that reaches the outer layers. Tophat utilizes IDS that are placed deep in
the network, and the traﬃc at these layers is much more regulated due to the more
tightly controlled nature of the applications at intermediate levels in the system. For
example, a port scan (or its signature) at layer 1 is not necessarily an indication of
an attack and is therefore not actionable. At layer 2, however, a port scan is almost
certainly a strong alert because there is no legitimate reason for such traﬃc to exist
at that layer in the network. Tophat uses IDS alerts from deep inside the network
to regulate the risk value of any network ﬂow. However, due to the stateful nature of
its operation, it is capable of tolerating occasional false alerts from some IDS, or even
repeated false alerts for a given ﬂow from a small number of layers of the system.
An acceptable alternative is to use a lesser number of IDS and/or to use correlation
techniques to generate alerts for a speciﬁc ﬂow [27]. In this paper, however, I make a
simplifying assumption that each server instance has an IDS.

2.2.4

Legitimate Client Model

I deﬁne a legitimate client as a system user that has no malicious intent and is
using the target application for its designed purpose. Whenever the client wishes to
use the service, it makes a request to the outward facing service IP address. The
SDN maintains a whitelist forwarding table in the Internet-facing switch, and the
new client (identiﬁed by {source IP, source port}) is not in that list. This triggers
a control action in the SDN switch—it contacts the controller and asks where to
forward the client’s network ﬂow. This allows the SDN controller to assign the client
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to a particular front end server. Once this assignment is complete, the client continues
to establish its application level connection, eg, perform a three-way TCP handshake
and make web requests. Each client generates one network ﬂow that touches each of
the layers of the distributed application. Further details on this process are described
in Section 2.4.5.

2.2.5

Attacker Model

The attacker begins as a normal client establishing a connection to the service.
Once connected, the attacker looks for vulnerabilities in the outward facing layer 1.
If the attacker is detected, then the client is blocked and the attacker must generate
a new identity (through a proxy for a new IP for example). Once an exploit is found
in layer 1, the attacker stages an attack on layer 2 from inside the periphery of the
protected system, ie from layer 1. In moving from one layer to an inside layer, the
attacker leverages elevated privileges that she has gained at the outer layer server. If
an ongoing attack is ﬂagged by an IDS at any layer, layer 2 and further inside, then
Tophat is activated. If the attack is undetected, then it may proceed to the next
layer, until reaching the crown jewel. The attacker will persist until isolated, and
then the attacker’s exploit paths will be patched via external traﬃc analysis, such
as through a honeypot. The assumption of persistence of the attack is crucial for
Tophat to be eﬀective. If the crown jewel is accessed through a ﬂow that does not
generate any IDS alert, then the attacker is successful and Tophat will never even
be invoked. There may be multiple attackers present concurrently in the system.
Tophat works by making a few assumptions about the nature of the multi-stage
attacker:
• Persistent Attacks (PA) if a server is reset, or the attacker connects to a
new server, then the attack must be repeated. Predecessor stages in an attack
must be repeated if the attacker is re-connected to a new server.
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• Strong Alerts (SA) the attacker will generate at least one strong alert during
a MSA. The strong alert is an alert that with high certainty is known to be part
of an attack (eg, brute force attacks, known exploit signatures, or other high
priority2 alerts). It is important to stress that only in the case of a strong alert
is the algorithm of Tophat triggered. If no strong alert is input to Tophat,
then the attacker will be successful in reaching the crown jewel.
• Non-zero Exploit Time (TX ) each stage of an attack will take non-zero time,
with the time for an exploit to be successful (discovery to access transition)
being a random variable.

2.3

Solution Overview
Tophat utilizes software deﬁned networks (SDN) and intrusion detection sys-

tems (IDS) to monitor and attribute alerts to speciﬁc attackers. At its core, Tophat
sits along side SDN controller software where it can observe the network ﬂows and
make decisions about changes to the network. It is installed as an application over
a SDN open ﬂow controller, such as an OpenDaylight Controller [28], and interfaces
with IDS alerts generated throughout the distributed system. The algorithm then
chooses which clients will be connected to which outward-facing servers, and which
downstream servers are connected to which upstream servers in the distributed application.
Tophat’s algorithm operates by maintaining a risk factor for each connected
client and then modifying that risk factor whenever alerts are generated. As more
alerts are generated, the attacker’s stateful risk factor is increased until she can be
discriminated from the other connected clients. Whenever an alert is generated, the
risk is increased for all the ﬂows that are passing through the alerting service. The
clients are then shuﬄed based on their risk so that over time, the attacker ends up
2

http://manual-snort-org.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/node31.html\#Snort_
Default_Classifications in Snort, rules are tagged with priority where “high” priority correlates
with strong in my solution
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with the maximum risk. The risk factor is initialized to zero for all clients and this
monotonically increases with alerts in the system, till the attacker is identiﬁed and
isolated. Then the risk factors of all the clients that are found to be legitimate in
retrospect are reduced (Risk Rebalancing as explained in Section 2.4.4). I classify this
protocol as an instantiation of Moving Target Defense (MTD), though it is somewhat
diﬀerent from the traditional notion of MTD. Here I am moving the clients and the
assignment of ﬂows to servers, while in traditional MTD, the protected system is
“moved”, ie reconﬁgured [29].

2.3.1

Tophat’s Intuition

Several challenges exist in protecting a distributed system that has the structure
shown in Fig. 3.1. First, alerts generated at any layer (i + 1) (i ≥ 1) look as if
they are coming from layer i, not from an external attacker. This argues against the
simple solution of blocking ﬂows from a particular source because that would create
a Denial of Service—if a server in layer (i + 1) blocks a server in layer i, then the
application stops working for all the clients connected to that particular server in layer
i. Tophat overcomes this limitation by attributing an attack to all clients that are
connected to the alerting server in layer i and then stopping the ongoing attack using
the MTD approach. When an alert event happens, all of the clients are disconnected
from the servers in layer 1 (for purposes of randomization), assigned to new servers,
and the alerting server is refreshed to a clean state and restarted. Tophat then
constantly tracks the attack history of each client with the help of the risk factor as
I describe in detail in Section 2.4.1, so that the attacker is identiﬁed due to multiple
alerts, which in turn is due to the persistence of the attack (as assumed in my attack
model). The persistent attack property fundamentally allows Tophat to converge
given a suﬃcient number of alerts.
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2.3.2

Legitimate Client Impacts

The SDN-based shuﬄing in Tophat can have some negative impacts on legitimate
client connections. First, whenever a shuﬄe involves a client, the client’s connection
is reset. This overhead cannot be avoided since the attackers and legitimate clients
share the same network ﬂow paths—a connection reset that disrupts an attacker’s ﬂow
also disrupts the legitimate client’s ﬂow. Its impact can be mitigated, however, with
state management approaches [30]. Second, when a server is being reset and restarted
(to clear the infected status), the clients assigned to that server cannot function. This
case can be minimized by using fast restart hardware or by keeping hot spares for the
server instances. The rate of this exchange is related to the attacker’s time to exploit
(TX ), so that fast-moving attacks will generate many alerts, which will require many
hot spares.

2.4

Detailed Design of Tophat
Tophat identiﬁes attackers performing multi-stage attacks on a distributed sys-

tem by algorithmically tracking risky behaviors of the attackers until the suspect
ﬂows are identiﬁed. In this section, I deﬁne two alternate algorithms in Tophat
that achieve this goal, each with a diﬀerent trade-oﬀ between the time to identify
attacker(s) and the amount of disruption to clients.

2.4.1

Objective

Ultimately, Tophat is designed to identify attackers in the system. Practically,
however, attacker identiﬁcation in Tophat resembles a probabilistic function rather
than an absolute measure because I do not have perfect internal causal relationships
between alerts and sources. Therefore, I deﬁne identiﬁcation as an event where a
single client has the highest likelihood of being an attacker. In the case of multiple
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attackers, this process is repeated so that multiple identiﬁcation events occur until
all of the attackers are exhausted.

Alert Group Attribution
In Tophat, there always exists a mapping between a server in any particular
layer and the clients that, through any possible path, have access to that server. For
example, if clients 1-5 are assigned to server S1 in layer L1, and S1/L1 is connected to
S2/L2, then an alert sourced from S2/L2 will be attributed to all the clients 1-5. The
relationship of how any given ﬂow passes through the servers at the diﬀerent layers is
itself controlled by the SDN controller and thus this relationship is always known to
my algorithm. Now I deﬁne a term client group. Consider that an alerting server has
ﬂows F1 , F2 , ..., FNG going through it. By tracing each ﬂow back to layer 1 servers, I
can map each ﬂow Fi to the client generating that ﬂow Ci . The clients C1 , C2 , ..., CNG
form the client group here. Each such client has its stateful parameter, risk factor,
increased by

1
,
NG

where NG is the number of clients in that particular group. In the

earlier example, each client would have its risk increased by 1/5.
I use the notation NAS for the number of servers (or in complete terms, server
instances) at the layer at which the alert is generated. If the alert is generated at
layer 2, and there are 3 database server instances as in Fig. 3.1, then NAS = 3. In
my model for the protected system, there can be a diﬀerent number of servers at
diﬀerent layers. This parameter is important for determining the convergence time
of my algorithms, as seen in the next sections.

Likelihood of a Client Being the Attacker
I deﬁne the likelihood as follows:
P (Ci = A) = P

R(Ci )
R(Cj ) ∀ R(Cj ) ≥ R(Ci )

(2.1)
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where Ci is client i, Ci = A is the indicator that Ci is an attacker, R(Ci ) is the risk
factor of client i, and ∀ R(Cj ) ≥ R(Ci ) implies that client j has a risk factor at least
as large as client i, and i = j is allowed. In this way, if a client has the highest risk
factor of any client, then this probability value becomes 1.

Control and Convergence
In Tophat, I control, through SDN controller rules, the assignment between
clients and the layer 1 servers. Likewise I control the route each ﬂow takes through
servers at diﬀerent layers. The full generality of the design space for Tophat allows
for a ﬂow passing through server A in layer i to be mapped to any server B in layer
i + 1. I call this conﬁguration the non stove-piped conﬁguration and this allows for the
greatest ﬂexibility to mix and isolate the diﬀerent ﬂows as they ﬂow through servers
at the diﬀerent layers. However, this increases the amount of state that needs to be
maintained at the SDN controller - the mapping of the ﬂow through each layer. For
a simpler conﬁguration option, I introduce the stove-piped conﬁguration whereby the
grouping of ﬂows that are incident on a certain server at layer i is maintained at
layer i + 1, and this holds for all layers in the system. I ﬁnd that the overhead of
state maintenance at the SDN controller is fairly minimal for all but the largest of
deployments and therefore the non stove-piped conﬁguration is desired from a security
standpoint.
The algorithm converges whenever:
∃ i, P (Ci = A) ≥ τ

(2.2)

The user-settable parameter τ allows Tophat to control the balance of false alarm
and speed of identifying the attacking ﬂows. A higher value of τ will mean fewer
legitimate clients will be ﬂagged but the convergence time will also increase. In the
extreme, setting τ = 1 will mean that only the ﬂow with the highest risk factor will
be designated as malicious. Section 2.4.6 discusses conditions where convergence may
fail with multiple attackers present.
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2.4.2

Uniform Assignment Algorithm (“Uniform”)

The uniform assignment algorithm is responsible for assigning arriving client ﬂows
at layer 1 to diﬀerent servers at layer 1. There are NS assignment pools available,
where NS is the number of servers in layer 1. For each client i, an assignment is
made: A : Ci → [1, NS ] such that the imbalance in risk between any two servers is
minimized. At the beginning of the operation of the system, each client will have
the same risk factor and so this will be a uniform random assignment. However,
in subsequent mappings (which happen after an alert arrives at Tophat) the risk
factors will be diﬀerent and the mapping A will be a weighted random assignment,
using the risk factors as the weights. The goal is to balance the aggregate risk at any
of the servers in level 1. The assignment process proceeds as follows:
1. A client seeks an assignment, either when it is connecting to the protected
system for the ﬁrst time, or in response to a disconnection forced by Tophat.
2. The client is given the assignment to [1, NS ] according to the assignment function A.
3. When a new alert is received, the assignments between clients and servers are
reset, and all clients return to step 1 and re-assigned to new servers.
This algorithm eﬀectively assigns clients such that there is a uniform aggregate
risk assigned to any particular server. In this way, each attribution event reduces the
set of ties (NT = |∀ R(Cj ) ≥ R(Ci )|) to

NT
,
NAS

where NAS is the number of servers

in the alert layer. For example, initially, if there are 100 clients and 4 alert groups,
and every client has a risk of 1, then by Eq. 2.1, P (Ci = A) =

1
100

∀ i. After an

attribution event, given uniform assignment (each server having balanced risk of 25,
thus 25 clients per server), then the likelihood for those 25 becomes

1.04
1.04×25

because

the 25 clients that were attributed with risk have an additional 0.04 added. The size
of the set |R(Cj ) ≥ R(Ci )| is now

100
4

= 25, following the described reduction.
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Convergence
Using this algorithm, with NAS servers at the alert generating layer and NC static
clients, a single attacker will be found after NR = dlogNAS NC e alerts because the
reduction of NT by

1
NAS

resembles the height of a balanced tree with NC leaves

and NAS branches at each alert. In a multi-attacker case, each attacker must be
responsible for NR alerts, where each alert independently causes a shuﬄe, in order
to converge—as there are eﬀectively NA simultaneous risk trees being built. Here in
one case, the attacker who generates alerts at a rate faster than the others will be
identiﬁed ﬁrst. In some cases, multiple attackers will be present in the same group, or
multiple alerts will occur before step 3 is achieved in this algorithm, and these alerts
will not count towards NR . For example, if there are a total of 3 alert groups, and
each group generates an alert before a shuﬄe event, then the risk of all the clients
goes up (uniformly in this case) and that makes no progress toward convergence.

2.4.3

Low-Risk Isolation Algorithm (“LRA”)

This variant of the algorithm extends the previous one by sheltering low risk
clients into a safe zone. A safe zone is deﬁned as a set of servers in layer 1 such
that clients which are assigned to this set are not shuﬄed around by Tophat. Thus,
these clients do not suﬀer from any disconnections and their risk factors do not change.
Each alert/attribution event tells Tophat something about who may be the attacker,
but it can also indicate who is not an attacker. In the uniform case, the legitimate
clients are mixed in with the attackers, and this causes them to rise in risk, whenever
they share a server with the malicious clients. It also dilutes the attribution power
of a single attack since NG remains near-constant. The Low Risk Assignment (LRA)
variant avoids this issue by placing some portion of the clients with the lowest risk
into a safe zone:
1. Clients are assigned as in the uniform risk case, except for clients that exist in
a safe set SS , initialized as empty.
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2. After an attribution event a portion of the clients, IR , IR ∈ (0, 1), is moved from
the active set SA to the safe set SS . The |SA | · IR clients with the lowest risk
are moved to SS .
3. The assignment of the safe clients SS is ﬁxed to a particular server, and then the
clients in the active set SA are redistributed among the remaining NS − Nsaf e
servers using the uniform risk approach.
4. In the event an alert is generated from any of the SS clients, then the entire set
of clients is moved back to the SA set.
Using this approach for a single attacker, much less risk is assigned to the legitimate clients in the system. Additionally, they are provided an uninterrupted connection path to the protected application, therefore decreasing the negative impacts
from Tophat’s assignment approach (Section 2.3.2).

Convergence
This approach converges slightly slower than the uniform risk for the same number
of servers NS . Some servers at each layer are saved for handling the clients in the
safe set SS , thus the convergence for a single attacker is NR = dlogNAS −Nsaf e NC e
where NAS is the number of servers at the alert layer and Nsaf e is the number of
servers used for the safe zone. For multiple attackers, there is a chance that an
attacker ends up in the SS set of clients and causes a reset of the set back into the SA
set. This is advantageous to the attacker and slows down the speed of convergence.
However, if the multiple attackers have very diﬀerent times to exploit, then there
is less likelihood of the above case because the malicious ﬂows will rarely have low
risk factors. The LRA approach is designed to keep trusted clients connected to the
application continuously without suﬀering from any disconnections due to the shuﬄes
of my algorithm.
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2.4.4

Risk Rebalancing Approach (“RRB”)

Once one of the attackers is identiﬁed by using any one of the above described
algorithms, the risk factor of the remaining clients are updated using Risk Rebalancing
(RRB) technique in order to speed up the convergence to identify the remaining
attackers. Each alert attribution is stored in the SDN controller that contains the
list of clients and the amount of risk factor attributed to each client due to that
particular alert. Whenever an attacker is identiﬁed, the list of alerts is searched, and
the set of alerts that involved the attacker are collected. The accumulated risk for
each client due to each alert in that list is removed because of the insight that the
alert is attributable to the now discovered attacker and not the other clients. Thus,
legitimate clients have their risk lowered leading to faster identiﬁcation of the other
attackers.

2.4.5

End-to-end Workﬂow

I detail the end-to-end workﬂow of Tophat in the context of an SDN-based
system:
1. Initial: The SDN switch at ingress node forwards each new client’s request to
the SDN controller as the ﬂow table will be initially empty. Tophat, which is
installed as an application over the SDN controller, stores the associated risk
and the server allocated at each layer for all the clients.
2. Server Assignment: Tophat assigns each client to a particular server at
layer 1 as described in Sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3. Then the corresponding ﬂow
rules are installed at the SDN switch in layer 1 and subsequent layers. The
initial risk factor of all the clients are set to 0. I denote by TS the time for
server assignment.
3. Connection Establishment: Each client establishes a connection with the
servers at layer 1 using TCP 3-way handshake. At this point, all the clients
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except the attackers can access the servers in subsequent layers using their
respective access privilege. (TC : Time to establish connection).
4. Attacker Exploration: In order to get access to the subsequent layers, the
attackers have to explore the layer 1 server for vulnerabilities and then exploit
a vulnerability. Let Tx denote the time to exploit a server at a particular layer.
Tx varies across diﬀerent layers and across diﬀerent attackers.
5. Alert Generation: The attacker continues to compromise the servers at subsequent layers until an IDS detects a malicious action (e.g., port scan, known
CVE, etc.) or alert correlation from multiple IDS alerts generates a strong alert.
Let TA be the time to generate a strong alert.
6. Connection Termination: The strong alert is sent to the SDN controller,
which initiates the shuﬄing by disconnecting the clients from the servers in
layer 1 (except those in the safe set for LRA) and reassigning them.
7. Risk Updation: The risk factor of the clients are updated according to either
the Uniform or the LRA scheme. Let TRA be the time to update risk values.
8. Attacker Identiﬁcation: After the risk updation, the probability of each
client is calculated using Equation (2.1). The clients with a probability P (Ci =
A) ≥ τ are identiﬁed as attackers and isolated.
9. Risk Rebalance: After the attacker is identiﬁed, Tophat rebalances the risk
factor of all the remaining clients (Section 2.4.4).
10. Server Reset: Tophat instructs the SDN controller to reset all the active
servers in the network by broadcasting a control message which ensures that
the attackers need to exploit it again, in order to re-initiate the MSA. Let
TR be time to reset a server. There are several prior works [31, 32] that can be
combined with Tophat to maintain the state of the clients when the connection
is re-established. Anatoliy et al.

[31] developed a system for reconnecting a
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client to the host service such that the user’s session with the host service
is maintained through the connection being re-established. This is done by
buﬀering and maintaining the data communicated between the client and the
host service. Another system developed by Srinivasan et al. [32] can be readily
used with Tophat since it provides seamless takeover of client sessions in a
virtual machine environment. This system operates by using multiple virtual
machine for redundancy in which the ﬁrst virtual server is operated in an active
role to server all the clients and the second identical virtual server is maintained
in a passive role. The second virtual server will takeover the ﬁrst virtual server
to preserve the state of the clients during the client disruptions.
11. Connection Re-establishment: All the clients including the attackers will
re-initiate connections to the servers in layer 1 and the steps repeat.

2.4.6

Multiple Attackers

Multiple simultaneous attackers can be handled by Tophat, without any modiﬁcation. I model multiple attackers as each having independent, random times to
exploit (TX ), where a successful exploit results in an alert being generated. If one
attacker is more aggressive (smaller TX ), then alerts will be generated due to this
attacker and this attacker will be identiﬁed by Tophat before moving on to the next
attacker. This essentially makes the process of identifying multiple attackers sequential. If on the other hand, there are multiple attackers with similar TX values, then it
will be a matter of chance which attacker gets identiﬁed ﬁrst. But the risk factor of
the other attackers will be retained in Tophat, thereby helping in the convergence
time for the subsequent attackers.
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Fig. 2.2.: SDN model system considered for the evaluation section.

False Positives and Mitigation
It is possible for Tophat to generate false positives with multiple attackers present
that have similar TX . For example, if there are four clients C1-C4, of which C2 and C4
are malicious and two servers S1 and S2. In the ﬁrst round, C1 and C2 are assigned
to S1 and C3 and C4 to S2. C2 alerts resulting in reshuﬄing. In the next round, C1
and C4 happen to be assigned to S1 and C2 and C3 to S2. Now C4 alerts and as a
result, the legitimate client C1 is falsely ﬂagged. This is a relatively rare occurrence
and I show the false positive rate in Experiment 4 (it is below 5% even in the most
pathological case).
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Table 2.1.: Default Network and Time Parameter Values.
Notation

Meaning

Default Value

NC

No. of clients

1000

NA

No. of attackers

4

NS

No. of servers at layer 1

3

NL

No. of layers

4

Lalert

Strong alert layer number

2

IR

Ratio of clients moved from active set to safe set

0.25

TS

Server allocation time

1 ms

TC

Connection establishment time

30 ms

TA

Alert generation time

1 ms

TRA

Risk assignment + attacker identiﬁcation time

1 ms

TR

Server reset time

45 s [33]

TX

Attacker Exploit Time

Normal Distribution

Table 2.2.: Default Attacker Exploit Time TX for 4 Attackers.
Attacker No.

TX at Layer 1
Mean (s)

Variance (s)

1

20

2

TX at Layer 2
Mean (s)

Variance (s)

5

30

5

40

5

60

5

3

10

2

15

2

4

80

5

80

5
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2.5

Experimentation

2.5.1

Model System

The ﬁgure 2.2 describes the default SDN Network and tables 2.1 and 2.2 shows
the default values for the network parameters and the exploit time for 4 attackers
respectively that are considered for the evaluation of the experiments described in
the below sections . All the experiments are evaluated using the default values unless
otherwise speciﬁed. As shown in ﬁgure 2.2, for the sake of simplicity I consider that
each server in layer i has a stove piped connection or one-one connection (represented
by diﬀerent colors) to any server in layer i+1 in order to avoid mixing of network
ﬂows at later stages. The experiment 5 shows the convergence for non-stove piped
case. In LRA approach the server 3 is considered to be safe server and the clients in
active set SA are shuﬄed between the server 1 and server 2.

Simulation Environment
Along with Tophat, the SDN environment is remodeled using the network and
time parameters in C++3 . Each event in the SDN environment is represented by a
corresponding time component as described in section 2.4.5 and the network elements
are given by the parameters in table 2.1. The clients are assigned to the available
servers using uniform random distribution and the attacker’s exploit time is modeled
based on normal distribution as in table 2.2. For each attacker, the exploit time
varies by mean across each layer and varies by variance across diﬀerent iterations or
shuﬄes. For some experiments, where multiple simulations can be aggregated, I take
the median of 20 runs to provide data smoothness with respect to the random attack
times.
3

https://github.rcac.purdue.edu/DependableComputingSystemsLab/TopHat

30
Evaluation Parameters
For simpliﬁcation, I assume all the clients send requests to the servers at layer 1 at
the same time. All the experiments described below are evaluated using the following
parameters:
Experiment Time: This parameter indicates the time at which particular event
like server assignment or alert generation happens.
Convergence Time: The time at which single attacker or all the attackers are
found.
Probability of Attacker found (PA ) This is the probability of attacker being
identiﬁed correctly as an attacker given by equation 2.1
Percentage of Failed Transactions (PFT) This parameter indicates the number of client disruptions during the time of attacker identiﬁcation. It is a function of
time given by
P F T (t) =

N o.of F ailedT ransactions
T otalN o.of T ransactions

(2.3)

where I model client transactions as continuous time event for simplicity. I aggregate
PFT across clients and all time to compute a cumulative PFT for the purpose of
comparing per-simulation metrics. Note that the PFT is per-client, and not all clients
are disrupted simultaneously during a shuﬄe event in Tophat.

2.5.2

Experiment 1: Convergence over Time

The experiment 1 demonstrate Tophat’s operation in the time domain for both
single and multiple attackers. During each attack, the two primary metrics (PFT
and PA ) are collected based on the experiment time at which an alert is generated.
Default values are used for all parameters except NA . Fig. 2.3 shows the results from
my simulation, with the single attacker in Fig. 2.3a and two attackers in Fig. 2.3b.
The results are explained in the next sections.

31
Convergence
In case of single attacker, the convergence is given directly by PA and for two
attacker’s case, it is given by average probability. At each alert generation, the
probability is updated, and the value for the attacker increases as shown in the ﬁgures.
The experiment time at which the PA becomes is the time at which the attacker is
found. The uniform algorithm converges more quickly in both cases primarily because
it has 3 servers to use for risk attribution while LRA reserves a server for the safe
pool and uses only 2 servers for risk attribution. The step function increases as
the number of ties are broken, and the attacker is repeatedly involved in high-risk
attribution events. I ﬁnd that the algorithm does converge and single out the attacker
in both cases given suﬃcient time, demonstrating my primary claim.
In the case of multiple attackers, one attacker has a faster exploit time than the
other. Since shuﬄes occur on the fast attacker’s alert, the slow attacker is statistically unlikely to ever generate an alert until the fast attacker has been disrupted.
This causes a time-domain crowding of alerts early in the simulation until the ﬁrst
attacker is identiﬁed, and then the alerts become more spaced out as opposed to an
independent case where the alerts would be interleaved. Upon close inspection, one of
the LRA’s potential weaknesses can be seen in that it is using more shuﬄes to identify
the attacker in the two attacker case. Furthermore, because the slow attacker has
low risk, she can be placed in the safe zone, and it is more likely that a slow attacker
can generate an alert inside of the safe area–something that does not happen in this
experiment, but will in a later experiment. Of note, the dip in probability around 750
seconds for LRA is due to the metric being a mean: the slow attacker’s probability
goes down oﬀsetting the rise in the fast attacker’s probability.

PFT
The PFT shows how clients are impacted through time. In all cases, the width
of the PFT bar represents the reset time for cleaning impacted servers in the system
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TR . For the uniform algorithm, all clients are re-assigned and all servers on the attack
path are cleaned, resulting in outages for all of the clients, hence the peak is always
at 100. In the LRA case, only those clients remaining in the active set are impacted
for each attack. This results in a decaying PFT over time as the low risk clients are
assigned to the safe server at the rate IR . Consequently, system operators have a
choice between faster convergence and attacker identiﬁcation (the Uniform variant)
or slower convergence with better client access (the LRA variant).
For multiple attackers, in the Uniform case the PFT follows the single attacker
proﬁle, but it is repeated for the second attacker with a higher width due to TX . For
the LRA case, since less shuﬄing servers are available, it takes more alerts to converge
and thus more shuﬄes, and more period of high PFT. Of note, however, is that the

1
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PFT is never reset–that is the pool of safe clients never generates an alert.
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Fig. 2.3.: The convergence of Tophat is shown for the single attacker and two
attacker cases with both the uniform and low-risk assignment (LRA) algorithms.
The LRA converges more slowly (top) but has better access for the legitimate clients
(bottom).

33
2.5.3

Experiment 2: Convergence vs. Parameters

This experiment explores the convergence properties of both the Uniform and
Low Risk Assessment (LRA) approaches to attacker identiﬁcation. I explore four
parameters: the number of clients NC , servers at the alert layer NS , attackers NA ,
and the LRA’s active-to-safe movement ratio IR . All of these results are in Fig. 2.4
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Fig. 2.4.: Convergence time and the client’s cumulative PFT is shown for four parameters in my simulation.
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Number of Clients
This experiment, show in Fig. 2.4a, increases the number of clients connected
to a system with the default number of servers and attackers. The x-axis is show
in log scale, and the time to ﬁnd all attackers is linear in the convergence time for
the uniform case, matching the expectation from Section 2.4.2. For the LRA, it is
roughly linear, but it suﬀers from placing attackers into the safe pool of clients. In
the PFT metric, the LRA performs much better due to this safe pool, as expected.
This experiment conﬁrms Tophat’s scalability with the number of clients.

Number of Servers
Adding additional servers to Tophat, thus increasing NAS , improves convergence
speed incrementally by

log(NS +1)
.
log(NS )

This is because additional servers provides ﬁner

granularity in the alert attribution phase, thus singling out attackers more quickly.
Fig. 2.4b shows this convergence trend for the two algorithms. The same general
trends from earlier experiments hold, but LRA’s advantage in PFT begins to disappear with a large number of shuﬄing servers and only a single safe server.

Number of Attackers
As the number of attackers increases, the number of alerts required to identify the
attacker increases linearly. Fig. 2.4c shows the trend with NA in the range of 2 to 10.
At higher number of attackers, it takes longer to converge as expected in the uniform
case, but it also impacts the LRA super-linearly because it increases the probability
that a slow, low-risk attacker will enter the safe pool. Even with this risk, the LRA
is still able to outperform the Uniform algorithm in the PFT metric.
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LRA Movement Ratio
This experiment, as shown in Fig. 2.4d, only applies to the LRA algorithm. The
IR parameter controls how many clients are relocated from the active set to the safe
set after each shuﬄe. If this ratio is too low, then the convergence speed and PFT
will be the same as uniform but with 1 less server in the shuﬄe set. If this ratio is
too high, then up to half of the shuﬄes will be wasted on safe server alerts—the alert
will come from the server that has all of the clients connected to it, and no useful
attribution can take place. At an ideal ratio, the attacker has limited chance of being
moved to the safe server, which in this case is 75%. In future work, the ratio can be
modulated based on an estimate for the number of attackers in the system.

2.5.4

Experiment 3: Attacker Eﬀort

In this experiment, I demonstrate how Tophat, by utilizing MTD, is able to
increase the total attack eﬀort that must be expended to compromise the protected
system. I measure attacker eﬀort as the number of times a server must be compromised, at any layer, by any attacker. This includes the eﬀort spent exploiting servers
that have been reset. I also measure the number of shuﬄes or alerts generated in the
system, and this metric covers the number of trials an attacker has at penetrating a
system for which the exploit is not known.
Fig. 2.5 shows the eﬀort in these two metrics. In Fig. 2.5a, the total exploits goes
up with the number of attackers. This process is not linear, however, because many
attackers will be reset even when they do not generate an alert themselves due to the
moving target nature of Tophat. Each attacker may penetrate layer 1 and be shuﬄed
before making an attempt on layer 2, for example. Consequently, Tophat is able to
make it much more diﬃcult to attack the system when multiple attackers are present,
even if the attacker identiﬁcation takes some time. In Fig. 2.5b, the total number of
resets are shown. This scales roughly linearly with the number of attackers because
there is a lower limit to this number until the attackers can be found, as described
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Fig. 2.5.: Each attacker in the system repeatedly compromises various servers in the
system. These ﬁgures demonstrate how many total compromises occurred before the
attacker was found and show the number of alerts generated during the attacker’s
exploration phase.

in Section 2.4.2. Of note here, however, is that there are a limited number of exploit
attempts allowed at layer 2 before the attackers are identiﬁed and a layer 1 patch can
be created. These 5-100 alerts will attribute the attacker, and upstream compromises
(at layer 1) can be patched as a result, a key beneﬁt of Tophat.

2.5.5

Experiment 4: Eﬀect of Risk Re-balancing

For this experiment, I evaluate the impact of the risk re-balancing (RRB) technique (Section 2.4.4) on the convergence time and the false positives. I stress the
system by having multiple attackers with the same distribution for TX . Without
RRB, when an attacker is identiﬁed, the risk for all other clients is reset to zero.
With RRB, when an attacker is identiﬁed, only the legitimate clients that had been
mixed in with the identiﬁed attacker have their risk reduced, not reset to zero.
Fig. 3.5b shows the impact of RRB on both the Uniform and the LRA algorithms.
In both cases, the use of the RRB speeds up convergence as expected. The number
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Fig. 2.6.: Experiments 4 (left) and 5 (right)

of false positives is higher for LRA. This is because the placement of many clients
in the safe zone and subsequent alerts from that zone can degrade the process of
identiﬁcation of the attackers. Tophat is still able to provide low false positive rates
(less than 0.5%) for small numbers of attackers relative to the total number of clients
(10), even in this challenging scenario of similarly aggressive attackers.

2.5.6

Experiment 5: Eﬀect of Number of Server Replicas

For this experiment, I use a system with 5 layers having [5, 4, 3, 2, 2] replicas in
the layers, starting from layer 1. The inter-layer connections are uniformly balanced
as much as possible. I evaluate the impact of alert depth on the risk attribution
algorithm. Fig. 3.6a shows the impact of the alert layer on the convergence speed
of both algorithms. The number of replicas decreases as one goes further inside the
system. This is not uncommon because the number of requests that touch servers
deep inside the enterprise typically decrease. I expect that alerts deep in the system
will provide less discriminating information about the attackers because the shuﬄing
can occur with coarser granularity, thus lumping more number of clients (legitimate
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with a few attacking) together on the same server. In the case of LRA, the safe zone
is on a single stove-piped layer while the other shuﬄing servers are all connected into
the multi-layer system. As the layer deepens, it is similar to reducing NS because the
size of the alert group increases and the number of groups NG decreases. Therefore
there is a logarithmic increase in the convergence time as the depth of the alert layer
increases.
2.6

Discussion and Future Work
In this paper, I presented a solution to the attribution problem using moving

target style defense through shuﬄing. This approach provides robust mitigation for a
variety of attacks for which strong IDS alerts exist, which is a cornerstone assumption
for Tophat. This assumption can be relaxed with the use of a more probabilistic
risk assessment model that adapts risk to the quality of the alert, so that alerts
based on weak signatures can still be useful in identifying attackers. Tophat also
relies on restricted intra-layer communications which limits its applicability to some
applications. In some attack models, an attacker could move laterally between one
server and another if such a channel exists. I can extend Tophat by requiring
network IDS placement between servers in the same layer, which will enable detection
of such lateral movement. Finally, in Tophat, I have not provided any elastic replica
management. In cloud environments, it may be useful to scale the number of servers
based on the risk and alerts generated in the system to more quickly ﬁnd the adversary
and restore client connectivity. In future work, I will analyze when to expand or
contract the replica set.

2.7

Conclusion
In this paper, I presented Tophat, a solution to the problem of attributing an

alert to an attacker in a multi-layered system. The problem is challenging due to
the mixing of multiple ﬂows at servers inside the periphery of the system. Tophat
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utilizes moving target defense techniques, namely shuﬄing, implemented on top of
a software deﬁned network infrastructure. I provided two algorithms for shuﬄing,
one that focuses on convergence speed and another that focuses on improving client
connectivity during attacks. Further, I show that Tophat increases the attackers
eﬀort by requiring multiple re-exploiting of the target systems. I evaluate Tophat
using the metrics of time to detect and isolate the attackers and the impact on the
legitimate clients in the system. Using this system, network administrators can begin
to attribute alerts and attacks, to external ﬂows so that they may be blocked or
studied for further defense improvement.
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3. OPTIMISM: NEAR-OPTIMAL DYNAMIC
PLACEMENT OF INTRUSION DETECTION SENSORS
TO IDENTIFY MULTI-STAGE ATTACKS IN SOFTWARE
DEFINED NETWORKS
3.1

Introduction
Multi-stage attacks (MSA) [8, 34] are attacks where privilege escalation exploits

on outward facing services are leveraged to gain access to subsequent services, many
of which are not directly accessible from outside the network. These attacks proceed
in a stepping-stone manner until reaching the protected asset or crown jewel deep
inside the network. These threats require placing network security appliances, such
as intrusion detection sensors (IDS) [35, 36], at multiple points through the network.
Simple strategies for IDS placement have their drawbacks. For example, placing
IDS just at the edges of the networked system cannot monitor activity past the
ﬁrst stage of the attack while placing at the crown jewel itself does not allow for
pre-emptive mitigation actions. It is also not feasible to place IDS at every single
system component because they are expensive in terms of computation, networking,
and maintenance. Also, processing the alerts from the IDS has signiﬁcant analysis
overhead due to false alarms and so a place-everywhere strategy will lead to a deluge of
non-functional work. Thus, system administrators have to deal with the placement
problem: place IDS to maximize network protection while minimizing deployment
costs.
The choice of which point/server to place an IDS on cannot be decomposed into
a greedy solution because of the binary nature of the selection problem that maps to
a 0-1 knapsack formulation and also because the eﬀectiveness of downstream IDS is
impacted by the presence of upstream sensors. An IDS placed at a point closer to
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the ingress (say point A) may make it redundant to place an IDS with substantially
overlapping functionality farther inside the network (say point B) if there is a single
network path that can go from point A to point B. Also, since the traﬃc at the ingress
points tends to be noisier (mix of legitimate, probe, and downright malicious traﬃc)
than deep inside, IDS typically have greater precision when placed farther inside.
In this chapter, I provide a budget-conscious approach for placing IDS in a network
to optimize their eﬀectiveness at stopping MSAs. The overall aim of this system
is to select an IDS placement conﬁguration such that the probability of attacker
reaching protected assets is maximally reduced and the corresponding deployment
cost is within the network administrator’s budget. I do this for both static and
dynamic scenarios, dynamic implying the attack paths or network ﬂows change and
necessitate re-evaluation of the IDS placement.
This system OPTIMISM (near-OPTIMal Intrusion SysteM) operates by
continuously monitoring the network traﬃc to dynamically decide on the IDS placements in response to both alerts and changing network ﬂows. In Optimism, I deﬁne
the MSA defense problem as selecting the best IDS placement conﬁguration across
time for a defended system with a cost constraint speciﬁed in terms of the number
of IDS placed integrated over time. Such a placement is elastic, where the number
of IDS can grow in response to new information that becomes available at runtime,
such as, more intense attacks being reported by the current IDS. The placement of
Optimism is also dynamic in that the locations where IDS are placed can vary over
time based on emergent runtime information, such as, changes in network topologies
or network ﬂows, or suspected attack paths. Such dynamic placement is enabled by
software deﬁned networks (SDN) [24, 37] that provide ﬂexibility in routing network
ﬂows through certain inspection points. The elastic scaling is achieved through network function virtualization (NFV) [38, 39] which allows IDS to be deployed as a
virtualized network function. I believe the solution presented here is the ﬁrst step
toward bringing in the notion of elasticity, the bedrock of cloud computing, to the
area of IDS placement in distributed systems.
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Optimism incorporates an algorithm that minimizes the cost of deploying IDS
while maximizing their eﬀectiveness at mitigating MSA by quantifying and balancing the beneﬁts and the deployment costs for any given IDS placement. Optimism
utilizes a directed acyclic graph to represent all of the server instances (nodes) and
network connections (edges) in a protected network. The edge weight represents the
probability that an attacker travels over a particular network connection (edge). I
deﬁne an optimization problem where the beneﬁt is the probability that an attacker
is detected before reaching a protected asset and the deployment cost is a function
of the IDS that are deployed. The optimizer in Optimism selects an IDS placement vector1 that maximizes beneﬁt while meeting a cost constraint or maximizing
the beneﬁt-to-cost ratio. I refer to these schemes respectively as cost constrained
optimization (CCO) and best value optimization (BVO). CCO is a cost conscious
approach while BVO provides better network protection by supporting elastic IDS
deployment. Optimism has a static component and a dynamic component. The
static component decides on the initial placement vector based on prior knowledge of
the network connectivities and the attack paths—the latter knowledge may be null.
The dynamic component is meant to mitigate new attacks through newly discovered
attack paths in response to IDS alerts and the information inferred from them. It
executes an incremental algorithm to dynamically move and elastically deploy the
IDS.
I test Optimism using MATLAB simulations as well as a physical testbed that
uses OpenFlow capable hardware switches. For a network with 11 servers and deployment cost as 20% of the complete-coverage cost (i.e., an IDS on each node), this
system’s beneﬁt is 60% more than the average beneﬁt of random placement. For a
cost of 3 IDS and with no information about the attacker, Optimism consistently
maintains over 90% of the maximum beneﬁt, i.e., the beneﬁt from complete information about the attack path. Due to Optimism’s online learning, dynamic adaption,
1
An IDS placement vector or IDS placement conﬁguration indicates the servers that are protected
by an IDS. The dimension of the vector is the number of nodes in the network graph. It is also
possible for a single Network IDS to inspect the ﬂow of multiple service nodes.
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and elastic control, the attacker’s probability of success is 65.8% lower than the stateof-the-art (Monitor-DSN16 [40]) on an average across all the deployment costs. My
evaluations in the SDN testbed conﬁrm the viability of Optimism and show how it
can adapt to alert information with new deployments in as little as 13.5 ms.
To summarize, I make the following contributions in this chapter:
1. Optimism selects IDS placement under budget constraints in a multi-layered
distributed system to identify multi-stage attacks such that the beneﬁt is maximized (i.e., minimizes the probability of an attacking ﬂow reaching the crown
jewel undetected). In achieving this, Optimism does not use the hard-tomaintain attack graphs but rather uses a network graph, which is typically
available to network administrators through the SDN controller.
2. Optimism responds in real-time to IDS alerts by incorporating alert information
into the optimization strategy and re-deploying the IDS to maximize beneﬁt.
In such dynamic decision making, Optimism elastically controls the number of
IDS deployed in the short term to maximize beneﬁt while meeting longer term
budget constraints.
3. Optimism is demonstrated on a hardware-based SDN testbed with a distributed
onion application and signiﬁcantly outperforms the state-of-the-art and is competitive to a complete-coverage case.

3.2

Related Work
Several prior works [40–45] have solved the problem of optimal placement of IDS

in a distributed system for diﬀerent types of attacks. However, fundamentally, they
lack in two important properties: elasticity and dynamism. The ﬁrst property refers
to the fact that under times of attack, the number of IDS may need to grow, and
under more benign conditions, the number should shrink. This elasticity should obey
some long-term budget thresholds in terms of number of deployed IDS. The second
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property refers to the fact that the original placement may need to be re-calibrated
when further attacker information becomes available at runtime, e.g., when some
network paths are observed to be carrying the dominant proportion of attacking
ﬂows.
Modelo-Howard et al. [41], Noel et al. [42] and Peng et al. [43] use attack graphs
to predict network vulnerabilities and perform alert inferencing to decide on IDS
placements. In practice, however, it is diﬃcult to generate attack graphs and to keep
them updated as the networks and applications are dynamically changing with new
vulnerabilities and resultant attack opportunities. This system does not rely on an
attack graph and instead use the much easier approach of maintaining network graph
with the help of SDN controller.
A system designed to optimize the location of IDS to stop Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks is BroFlow [44], which places IDS to maximize network coverage but only for
DoS attacks. My approach focuses on attack path coverage rather than network link
congestion. Hasan et al. [45] proposed an IDS placement system that uses network
segmenting within the larger network and places IDS at the segment border nodes.
If a multi-stage attack penetrates the border nodes, however, then there is no way to
detect the attacker inside these segments. My solution is focused on protecting speciﬁc
assets rather than general network segments, allowing the network administrator to
focus resources on targets of interest.
Thakore et al. (Monitor-DSN16 [40]) developed models to describe the system
assets and deﬁned a set of metrics like coverage and conﬁdence to reﬂect the IDS
eﬃciency by approximating a large number of parameters and then used optimization techniques to determine cost optimal and maximum utility IDS placement. But
approximating all the parameters and metrics is practically diﬃcult for large scale
distributed systems and also the approach is focused on maximizing the utility metrics like network coverage. I also show that Optimism outperforms Monitor-DSN’s
performance in terms of attacker’s probability of success by 65.8% averaged across all
the deployment costs.
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3.3

Models: System, Attack, and Defense
Optimism provides near-optimal IDS placement decisions when aggregated over

time. Optimal in this context means placing the budgeted number of IDS at the locations that gives maximum beneﬁt, which is obtained through exhaustive searching.
It does not mean placing an IDS on every single node. Here I describe the system
model, the threat model, and the required inputs to my algorithm.

Fig. 3.1.: An example distributed enterprise system that Optimism defends. The
experimental network graph shown in Figure 3.2 is closely modeled on this protected
system. (I use the term “server at stage i” and “server at layer i” interchangeably.)

3.3.1

Protected System Model

Optimism is designed to protect any distributed enterprise network against MSA.
Figure 3.1 shows an example of such a system where a potential attacker must compromise a web, database, and reporting server prior to having access to compromise
the ﬁle server that has protected information (“crown jewel”). I assume that all the
servers are connected via OpenFlow-capable switches [46] and controlled by a central-
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ized SDN controller [47] as shown in Figure 3.1. Optimism sits on top of the SDN
controller and deploys IDS [4] on the required servers, where deployment takes the
form of a virtualized network function, i.e., instantiating a VM which encapsulates the
functionality of the IDS. In my model a single Network IDS [5] can inspect the traﬃc
of multiple protected services (servers), as is often the case in practical deployments.
In this case, the SDN controller will be responsible for redirecting traﬃc for each of
these service nodes S1 , S2 , · · · , SN through the single physical IDS I. Logically this
will mean that my algorithm will place multiple IDS I1 , I2 , · · · IN , which all correspond
to the same physical IDS I, one in front of each protected service node. Optimism
decides to activate a subset of the sensors according to its decision captured in the IDS
Placement Conﬁguration. Using the techniques described in Section 3.5, the sensors
are inserted as virtual machines with bump-in-the-wire visibility into the traﬃc going
between each layer where placed. In Figure 3.1, the yellow-shaded IDS correspond
to the ones that have been activated. This implies that in my model latent IDS may
exist, not consuming resources, on each VM, or a set of IDS VMs may exist in the
network where they can be inserted into the network by updating the ﬂow rules in
the OpenFlow switches as discussed in Section 3.5.

3.3.2

Attacker’s Goal

MSA work on systems with multiple services between the attacker and the crown
jewels. I assume that the the attacker is successful whenever any crown jewel is
accessed, as in an exﬁltration attack. In a system with multiple crown jewels, access
to any one piece is suﬃcient. I do not consider interaction among multiple concurrent
attackers. My model can be taken to be a conservative simpliﬁcation that if there are
multiple concurrent attackers, then they are all perfectly colluding.
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3.3.3

Threat Model

Attackers in Optimism utilize a chained set of privilege escalations to access the
crown jewel. In a distributed service model with strict access controls, the attacker
must use access rights granted by intermediate services in order to access the crown
jewel. For example, only a web server is allowed to talk to a database server, and only
a reporting server is allowed to talk to a ﬁle server that has protected information.
The attacker must stage attacks on the database server only from the web server. In
this way, a series of exploits (web+database+reporting+ﬁle) are needed to succeed.
Attacks that bypass these access controls or attacks on the SDN controller itself are
not considered.

3.3.4

IDS Quality

At each stage of the MSA, the attacker must discover a vulnerability in that layer’s
service. If an IDS is present and can observe this process, then there is a chance that
the attempted exploit will overlap with an alert rule and will be ﬂagged by the IDS.
I introduce the IDS quality as a measure of the rate of alert generation to attack
attempts. For example, if 90% of the exploits that the attacker will attempt are
detectable by an IDS, then the IDS quality is 0.9. I assume independence between
the exploits covered by each IDS as they are defending diﬀerent types of systems from
diﬀerent types of probes. For example, the set of exploits and defense rules for a web
server are independent from those of a database server. The series quality of two IDS
(web+database for example) are thus multiplied in their alert generation rates, e.g.,
if the ﬁrst IDS has a quality 0.9 it will generate an alert 90% of the time, and 10%
of the time it will pass; if the second IDS also has a quality of 0.9 then 90% of the
attacks it sees will also generate an alert resulting in 99% of the attempted attacks
generating an alert. I rely on the IDS quality as an input provided by the network
administrator from prior quality characterization of the open source IDS tools such
as Snort [4] by using some measurement or IDS alert classiﬁcation approaches [48,49].
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After an IDS alert generation, the network administrator can take actions to protect
the system such as shutting down the services, launching an external investigation, or
implementing a moving target defense strategy to identify the attacker [29,50]. From
Optimism’s perspective, maximizing alert generation also maximizes the protection
of the crown jewel.

3.3.5

Cost and Beneﬁt

Optimism maximizes beneﬁt while minimizing deployment costs to provide nearoptimal IDS placements. The cost comes from the computing resources needed to
operate a sensor. The beneﬁt comes from the increase in alert generation rates as
the attacker tries to penetrate to a crown jewel. Since costs can have diﬀerent driving objectives from a system design perspective, I provide two models for low-level
optimization: Cost Constrained Optimization (CCO) and Best Value Optimization (BVO). CCO maximizes the beneﬁt subject to a ﬁxed budget where the
system administrator must keep deployment costs at or below a target budget. BVO
maximizes the beneﬁt-to-cost ratio—Optimism is provided with no ﬁxed budget but
instead picks the most eﬃcient placement. I use the BVO variant to support timevarying deployments because the beneﬁt for any particular placement can change as
attacks and the network ﬂows change, and a ﬁxed budget provides no opportunity to
elastically deploy IDS.

3.3.6

Dynamic Updates

Each IDS placement in Optimism is selected based upon the current network ﬂows
on the diﬀerent edges and the online learning model of the attacker (Section 3.4.5).
As time progresses, the network model and attacker model evolve so that the optimal
placement changes. In Optimism, I provide a method to incorporate new alerts by
updating edge weights that represent the frequency of attacking ﬂows on the system
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Fig. 3.2.: Network Graph for the sample distributed system given in Figure 3.1 for no
prior information about attacker. The values shown over the edges are the conditional
probabilities that the attacker will take that particular path next after reaching that
node.

network edges. The optimization module is re-run on the network graph with updated
edge weights that allows us to determine the new optimal placement.

3.4

Design Details of Optimism
Optimism reduces the costs of protecting a network against MSA by controlling

the number of IDS deployed while maximizing the beneﬁt provided by them. The
system takes as inputs (i) the network graph, (ii) information about the quality of
IDS, (iii) optionally, any available information about potential attack paths. The
output is a time-varying IDS placement conﬁguration.
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3.4.1

The Network Graph and Problem Statement

Optimism models the network using a directed acyclic graph (Figure 3.2) representing potential ﬂows (directed edges) between servers (nodes) in the protected
system, and the edge set is minimized due to access controls in place in the protected system. The network graph is readily available since the SDN controller has
the centralized view of the network. The graph has two sets of special nodes: the
edge servers (ES) with public-facing interfaces and the crown jewels (CJ) where protected information is stored. The attacker progresses from one of the edge servers
toward the crown jewel unless detected by an IDS in the attack path. I deﬁne IDS
presence as a binary vector IP of length N where IP (i) = 1 indicates IDS presence
immediately before server i and N is the number of servers in the system with possible IDS placement. IDS presence means that the logical ﬂow is routed through the
sensor prior to reaching the service—a single IDS instance could perform sensing for
multiple services provided it had suﬃcient computational and network resources.
I deﬁne two function prototypes that will be fully deﬁned in the later sections
to formulate the problem: fB (IP , IQ , G, EWA , CJ, ES) is the beneﬁt or protection
quality provided by a placement vector IP for IDS of a particular quality (IQ ) (also
vector of size N ) on a particular network graph (G) with current knowledge of the
attacker’s paths (EWA ), and fC (IP , IC , G) is the numerical deployment cost for the
placement for cost factors IC , which can be a function of traﬃc information and
computational resources. The edge weight (EWA (i, j)) is surrogate for conditional
probability that describe the likelihood that an attacker will proceed down the path
connecting i and j given she has arrived at node i. From these functions, I deﬁne two
problems to optimize.
(1) Cost constrained optimization (CCO):
IPCCO = arg maxIP fB (IP , IQ , G, EWA , CJ, ES)

(3.1)

fC (IP , IC , G) ≤ τC

(3.2)

subject to
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where τC is the cost upper bound or the target budget.
(2) Best value optimization (BVO): This combines the cost and the beneﬁt into
a single equation.
IPBV O = arg maxIP (1 − α) · fB (IP , ...) − α · fC (IP , ...)

(3.3)

where α (weight) controls the relative importance of each function such that high α
values are more sensitive to cost and tend to reduce the number of IDS deployed.

3.4.2

Beneﬁt Calculation

I wish to calculate the beneﬁt of a particular IDS placement conﬁguration fB (IP , ..).
First, I deﬁne the beneﬁt in terms of the probability that an attacker is successful:
beneﬁt (fB ) = 1 − P (AS)

(3.4)

where the attacker being successful means that she has accessed any crown jewel. For
multiple crown jewels, a max operator is used over P (AS) for each crown jewel.
For each node in the graph, I deﬁne two probabilities: PI (i), the probability an
attacker reaches the input of node/server i (as the input to the IDS) and PO (i), the
probability an attacker leaves the node i after compromising the IDS that was placed
before node i. If an IDS is placed before node i, then the probability of attacker
leaving node i is reduced by the IDS quality as PO (i) = (1 − IQ (i)) · PI (i), and if there
is no IDS at node i, then the probability PO (i) ← PI (i), where IQ (i) is the quality of
the IDS placed before node i (IQ (i)∈ [0, 1]).
Each node has a set of predecessors Preds(i) and successors Succ(i) (the input
and output arcs). I assume a server with no predecessors is in the edge server set ES.
The input probabilities are calculated as follows:
X
PT (j, i), 1)
PI (i) = min(

(3.5)

j ∈ Preds(i)

where PT (j, i) is the attacker’s probability to follow a path from node i to j.
PO (j) · EWA (i, j)
PT (i, j) = P
k ∈ Succ(j) EWA (k, j)

(3.6)
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where EWA (i, j) describes the weighted relative likelihood that the attacker, once
reaching i, will proceed next to j. These values are normalized across all possible
out edges so that the relative values of EWA for a set of successors from a node
determines the resultant conditional probability for the next step in the attacker’s
path. For nodes in the edge server set ES, they are initialized with:
EWA (na , i)
∀ i ∈ ES
j∈ES EWA (na , j)

PI (i) = P

(3.7)

where the node at na is a virtual node representing the external-facing interfaces to
the network where the attacker can start from. If there is no prior information about
the attack path, then the system assumes EWA (i, j) = 1 ∀ i, j in the edge set of
G meaning the attacker can take any path with equal probability. In Figure 3.2,
PI (1) = PI (2) = PI (3) =

1
3

= 0.33.

For a particular placement IP the probabilities PI and PO are calculated algorithmically:
1. Initialize all PI (i) = −1 ∀ i
2. Find PI (i) ∀ i ∈ ES using Eq. (3.7).
3. Repeat Eq. (3.5) , ﬁnd PO (i) = (1 − IQ (i)) · PI (i) , skipping any incomplete
nodes i that have (∃ j s.t. PI (j) == −1 ∧ j ∈ Preds(i)),
until PI (i) ≥ 0 ∀ i
From this calculation, I can directly calculate the attacker’s success:
P (AS) = PO (CJ)

(3.8)

thus fB = 1 − PO (CJ), the beneﬁt for placement IP . For multiple crown jewels,
P (AS) = max(PO (CJk )) ∀k ∈ CJ.
For example, using Figure 3.2, if the nodes 2 and 3 have no IDS deployed, PO (2) =
PI (2) = PO (3) = PI (3) = 0.33, then PI (8) = PT (8, 3) + PT (8, 2) = (0.33 ∗ 0.5) +
(0.33 ∗ 0.33) = 0.2778. If an IDS with IQ (8) = 0.8 is placed before node 8, then
PO (8) = (1 − 0.8) ∗ (0.2778) = 0.0556.
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3.4.3

Cost Calculation

The deployment cost for each placement is simply a summation of placement cost
factors IC . For a particular placement vector IP the deployment cost is
fC =

X

IP (i) · IC (i)

(3.9)

i∈G

which is simply the sum of the cost factors for each placed IDS. The cost factor IC
is typically complex and a function of system behaviors such as traﬃc volume or the
cost of displacing other virtual functions, or it could be guided by resource availability
such as number of CPUs on a machine.

3.4.4

Static Placement Optimization

Two optimization problems were presented in Eq. (3.1) and (3.3) for placing IDS,
i.e., optimizing IP . The IP space grows as 2N placement options, where N is the
number of servers with deployable IDS. So exhaustively ﬁnding the best solution is
impractical, especially at runtime. To solve the optimization problems CCO and
BVO, I use a genetic algorithm (GA)-based approach [51].

Genetic Algorithm (GA) Optimization
The GA was chosen as the optimization method because of its ability to quickly
determine a near-optimal solution in this large binary search space. I ﬁnd that in
practice exhaustive search becomes infeasible after N = 15 on my test mid-range
server class machine. Likewise, a linear programming approach would not work because the objective function is not a linear function of the IDS placement as it is
dependent on all of the placements and the network graph. Therefore I cannot guarantee that any placement is the global optimal. Recall that “optimal” means place
the budgeted number of IDS at the best locations that gives maximum beneﬁt, which
is obtained through exhaustive searching, not place an IDS on every single node.
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The GA is based on the process of natural selection, and it starts with an arbitrarily chosen IDS placement vector and evaluates the objective function, which is
given by Eq. 3.1 (CCO-S) or Eq. 3.3 (BVO-S). After each generation, the algorithm
selects parents which have the best outcomes of the objective function. Crossing and
mutating the parent vectors leads to the generation of new oﬀspring vectors, for which
the objective function is again calculated. This in practice leads to a nearly optimal
solution, as shown in Figure 3.3a and Figure 3.3b in Section 3.7.2. The parameter
values of the GA, including the termination condition, are given in Section 3.7.1.

3.4.5

Online Learning

The model parameter EWA (i, j) is time-varying and describes the likelihood an
attacker will take a particular edge. For a static analysis without any prior information about the attack paths, EWA (i, j) = 1 ∀ i, j in the edge set of G, thus a
uniform distribution is utilized for attacker probability calculations. This is a good
assumption when the attacker’s path is not known in advance or if the attacker behaves randomly. If the attacker sticks to a particular path until all attack attempts
are exhausted, e.g., by searching the known exploit space and re-attempting after
unsuccessful tries, then the system can utilize alerts generated by the IDS during
each attack trial to adjust the EWA (i, j) values to incorporate dynamic knowledge of
the attacker that Optimism is gaining.
First the system starts with at-rest or a priori edge weights EWAI (i, j) capturing
the system’s exogenous knowledge about the attack paths. Then an alert comes from
node q, and the system update the edge weights according to three alternate strategies
that I compare experimentally. To normalize each method I enforce a learning rate
constraint as
X

EWA0 (i, j) − EWA (i, j) = LR

(3.10)

i,j∈G

where i, j are the nodes in the graph, EWA0 is the new edge weight, EWA is the
old edge weight, and LR is the learning rate. Optimism then normalizes and scales
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updates to individual edges to bring up the sum to the speciﬁed LR. For example,
if two edges are updated with +1 edge weight and the learning rate (LR) is 6, then
the edges will scale to +3 each to satisfy this requirement. Using this parameter,
the rate at which new alerts skew the probability of an attacker being present can
be controlled. LR will be set higher for higher quality alert and its value reduced to
compensate for frequent false positives.

Predecessor Based:
The predecessor based method allocates additional weight uniformly to all edges
that exist between the edge servers and the alert node q. The edge weight is updated
as
EWA0 (i, j) = EWA (i, j) + LRF ∀ i ∈ all-preds(q), ∀ j

(3.11)

where all-preds are all of the ancestors of node q and LRF is chosen so that Eq. (3.10)
is satisﬁed, e.g., by setting LRF =

LR
.
|all-preds(q)|

The intuition behind this approach is

that nothing is assumed about the attacker other than she came from somewhere in
the set of possible paths between any node in ES and the alert node q.

Distance Based:
For this method, I increase the edge weights according to their distance from the
alert node q, favoring nodes that are closer to the alert node.
EWA0 (i, j) = EWA (i, j) +

LRF
shortest-path-dist(i, q) + 1

(3.12)

where LRF is a scalar that is chosen to satisfy Eq. (3.10) and shortest-path-dist
is the shortest distance between nodes i and q returning ∞ if there is no path.
Algorithmically this is implemented as a breadth ﬁrst search on the predecessors of
the alert node q, and nodes may be revisited thus EWA (i, j) may be updated multiple
times if it appears in multiple paths to the alert node which is a desirable behavior
in the updating process. Since there are no cycles the algorithm will converge. The
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intuition behind this approach is that the closer the node is to an alert the more likely
it is that the attacker will proceed through it in the future.

Path Based:
In this method, I ﬁrst ﬁnd all the paths between the edge servers and the alert
node. Let AP be the set of all paths between the ES edge servers and the alert node
q. The edge weight is updated as
EWA0 (i, j) = EWA (i, j) + LRF ∀{i, j} ∈ AP
where LRF is chosen so that Eq. (3.10) is satisﬁed, e.g., LRF =

(3.13)
LR
,
|AP |

and AP

may have repeated edges if they occur in multiple paths. The intuition behind this
approach is that the attacker is more likely to proceed down an edge that is more
common among all possible paths.

Edge Weight Decay:
Finally, I allow the edge weights to decay back to their initial conditions, EWAI ,
to account for time-dependencies between attacks:
EWA0 (i, j) = EWA (i, j) − DR · (EWA (i, j) − EWAI )

(3.14)

where DR is the decay rate. This decay is re-applied iteratively every DS seconds so
that the system returns to the same resting state if no alerts are generated. Systems
with a high DR-to-LR ratio favor the a priori information EWAI while systems with
a high LR-to-DR ratio favor new information.

3.4.6

Elasticity

Optimism is capable of selecting placement vectors with deployment counts that
scale as a function of the edge weights. This happens because when EWA (i, j) increases, new placements may become superior. As a result, the number of active
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IDS at any point in time can vary in response to the rate of alerts in the system. I
implement an elastic version of Optimism using BVO through online learning as I
describe next.
Originally the control for BVO, α in Equation 3.3, is speciﬁed statically by the
network administrator. Whenever the edge weights are updated, the number of deployed IDS grows as the system is more conﬁdent about where the attacker may be,
boosting the relative beneﬁt. I implement elastic Optimism by controlling the α
parameter in a feedback process with BVO optimization. The administrator deﬁnes
a target budget τC , and α is controlled as follows:
e(t) = fC (...) − τC

(3.15)

Eh ← Eh + e(t)

(3.16)

α0 = α + Kp · e(t) + Ki · Eh

(3.17)

where α0 is the new updated weight, Kp is the proportional gain and Ki is the integral
gain. The error signal (e(t)) measures how far oﬀ the current placement cost (fC )
is from the provided budget (τC ), Eh measures the cumulative error from the target
budget, reset to zero on system initialization and for τC changes, and the update to
α is calculated periodically by a proportional-integral (PI) controller [52] with gains
Kp , Ki . Kp and Ki are calculated using the Ziegler-Nichols tuning method [53, 54].
Basically, Ki is the integral term in the controller while KP is the proportional term.
A high value for either prevents any elastic growth while a low value will cause
the deployment to overshoot the target budget τC . However, KP never brings the
deployment below τC , while Ki does. Using this approach, the number of deployed
servers grows with BVO in the short term while maintaining long term cost objectives
as controlled by the term Ki ·Eh . Intuitively, the deployment will grow as many alerts
arrive in a short succession so that the IDS can localize where the attacker is coming
from. After some time, the deployment will enter a contraction phase because of
budget overruns (in Eh ).
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3.5

Implementing Optimism using SDN/NFV
In this section I describe how the algorithms are implemented using SDN and

NFV concepts.

3.5.1

IDS Operation

For Optimism I assume the IDS is a separate module from the protected service.
This could be a Snort [4] or similar software [55] running on a virtual machine as a
virtualized network function [38, 39]. Whenever an IDS is “placed”, a VM is started
with the IDS installed and operating, and all traﬃc destined to the protected machine
is re-routed through the IDS. The IDS itself can be started or stopped, cloned, etc.,
as decided by Optimism and implemented on a hypervisor such as VMWare ESXi.
I assume that the IDS is already prepared and available on standby and can simply
be started when needed, reducing overhead. Thus whenever the IDS is not utilized,
it will occupy only disk resources.

3.5.2

IDS Insertion

An IDS that is running but un-utilized (on standby) can be inserted into the network to protect a server by updating the routing rules in the OpenFlow switches [24,
46]. I accomplish this by implementing the services on top of separate virtual networks
(VLANs) and implementing routing using OpenFlow switches [56]. Each service and
IDS has a separate VLAN and corresponding subnet, and communication between
them is controlled by routing rules. For example, a web service exists on VLAN
ID=1, a database exists on VLAN ID=2, and an IDS exists on VLAN ID=5. During
the unprotected case, the OpenFlow switch will contain the ﬂow rule {source VLAN
1 subnet, destination VLAN 2 subnet, forward to VLAN ID=2}. Whenever the IDS
is inserted at database server, the ﬂow rule will be updated as {source VLAN 1 sub-
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net, destination VLAN 2 subnet, forward to VLAN ID=5}, {source VLAN 5 subnet,
destination VLAN 2 subnet, forward to VLAN ID=2}.

3.5.3

Controller

Optimism is deployed as an application over the SDN controller, ONOS [47]. It
is responsible for starting IDS VMs and updating routing rules to place them into the
network. Optimism ﬁrst learns the network graph (G) by viewing the unprotected,
IDS-free set of routing rules. From this G, the network administrator provides the
other parameters required to calculate the IDS placement vector. The controller implements the placement vector by starting the suﬃcient number of VMs from standby
and by updating the routing rules in the OpenFlow capable hardware switches.

3.5.4

IDS Alert Notiﬁcation

New alerts are communicated to Optimism by inserting a ﬂow rule with special destination IP address into the OpenFlow switch. Each switch is connected to
the control plane where Optimism can implement the placement vector. The IDS
communicates with this layer by sending specially tagged packets for which rules are
placed in the ﬂow table of the switch to pass them on to the controller. Optimism
then extracts the alert information like alert node ID (q in section 3.4.5) from this
packet.

3.5.5

Dynamic Placements

At each point in time, the placement vector can change depending on the alertdriven edge weights (as in section 3.4.5) and any changes in budgeting, e.g., by BVO
(as in section 3.4.6). Any changes in the deployment results in two kinds of actions
depending on whether or not the placement vector grows/shrinks in placement count.
If the placement count remains the same (as in CCO) then the change in the position

60
of IDS is implemented by updating routing rules in the switch. If the placements grow
(as in BVO), then Optimism starts a new IDS. Using this architecture, Optimism
can implement dynamic and scalable IDS placements on a SDN+NFV capable system.

3.6

Experimental Setup of Application, Attack, and IDS
Optimism works in a distributed environment with multiple sensors and place-

ment options. In this section, I describe how these components are modeled and how
the models connect with the experimental evaluation.

3.6.1

Distributed Application

I create an application as a generic, multi-tier onion application, which interacts
with servers at multiple stages till ﬁnally reaching the crown jewel, as shown in
Figure 3.1. The client starts by sending a request to the edge servers and after
traversing the multiple stages, the request gets serviced and the response progressively
traverses back to the client. For example, a client accesses a web service that accesses
a database service that accesses a reporting service that ﬁnally accesses a ﬁle service in
order to satisfy a request such as displaying last quarter’s earnings report. The reply
to the client is a chain of successful accesses by each layer of the onion, and access
from one layer to the next is controlled by whitelisting—the client cannot bypass
layers. The objective behind creating the onion application is that it can stand in for
many diﬀerent multi-stage applications and can be suitably parametrized to model
such applications—one common parameter is the number of stages, another is the
number of server instances of one kind at each stage.
An intuitive way to conceptualize the onion application is that as the request
traverses in, the server at each stage peels one layer of the onion. As the response
traverses out toward the client, the server at each stage adds a part to the response
for the client. For the i-th layer Li , of N layers, it sees a reply to a request C in the
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form R = {Li+1 (C), Li+2 (C), ..., LN (C)}. It then replies to Li−1 with R plus its own
Li (C).

3.6.2

Attacker Model

Attackers in the onion application attempt to extract a secret held at the core
using a series of privilege escalations or exploits that allow a layer to be bypassed. I
model this by adding a special command CA at each service. If the attack request
C ∗ = {CAi , C 0 } then C 0 is passed on to the next layer, where CAi is a secret or
exploit that is eﬀective on the i-th layer server. In a normal 2-layer request case,
the reply R(C) = {L1 (C), L2 (C)}, but if the command is C ∗ = {CA1 , C 0 }, then
R(C ∗ ) = {L2 (C 0 )}—the correct CA is in the command, so the C 0 is sent directly to
L2 as a new command. If C ∗ = {CA1 , CA2 }, then the crown jewel (L2 ) will return
the secret S as R(C ∗ ) = {S}. The attacker is successful when the attack command
matches C ∗ = {CA1 , CA2 , ..., CAN } and is thus able to exploit a vulnerability at each
server en route to the crown jewel.
I control the diﬃculty of ﬁnding a successful C ∗ by controlling the space of possible
CA values. I bound CA to integers (1, D). As the attacker is searching for C ∗ , she
locks in CAi after discovering its value and proceeds to attack the next stage server.
Therefore the probability that the attacker progresses from one layer to the next is

1
.
D

Such probabilities can be tied directly to existing multi-stage attack models [16, 57]
to capture the progression of an attacker in the system. For example, if there are
10 working exploits out of an attacker’s set of 20, then D = 2, since the likelihood
of ﬁnding the exploit is

10
20

=

1
.
2

This is a common scenario when using exploit

generation toolkits against deployed services—a fraction of the exploits in the library
of the toolkit will be successful against the service. The parameter D allows us to
control for the diﬃculty without getting tied down to speciﬁc exploit toolkits and
services.
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3.6.3

Intrusion Detection Sensor Characterization

The intrusion detection sensors look for commands that ﬁt the proﬁle of an attack.
At each layer, the sensor can investigate C to determine if it is an attempted exploit
or not. This determination is made by comparing C to a set of known attack values
IA . If the sensor is perfect, then CA ∈ IA , but I assume realistic IDS where this is not
the case and there is some overlap between C and IA . The request C can take D + 1
possible values, one extra for the legitimate request. One of these values is CA , and
the remaining D − 1 values of C also correspond to malicious requests. The sensor
covers I = |IA | of them, resulting in an IDS sensor quality of

I
D

= IQ . If a sensor is

present between layers i and i + 1, then the attack attempts CAi+1 are visible to the
sensor and any alerts will be transmitted to Optimism.
Each attempted exploit tried by the attacker (at one server) falls into one of three
categories: successful, unsuccessful, and detected/prevented. If an attacker possesses
an exploit that compromises the service, and there is no defensive rule in the IDS
available for that exploit, then it is successful. If the rule is in place, then it is
detected/prevented. If the exploit passes the sensor but has no eﬀect, due to the lack
of a vulnerable service, then the exploit is unsuccessful.

3.7

Experimentation
In this section, ﬁrst I discuss the simulation setup used for Optimism and then

discuss the experiments that evaluate the performance of Optimism. The last experiment shows Optimism’s behavior in a physical SDN testbed.

3.7.1

Experimental Setup

Optimism is modeled using MATLAB. For the experiments in this section, unless
mentioned, the parameters in Table 3.1 are used along with the graph in Figure 3.2.
In all experiments except the experiment on impact of prior attacker information
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Table 3.1.: Default Simulation Parameters
Input Parameter

Value

Edge Servers (ES)

Nodes 1,2,3

Crown Jewel (CJ)

Node 11

No. of Servers (N )

11

Initial Edge weights (EWAI (i, j) ∀ i, j in G)

1

IDS Quality (IQ (i) ∀ i in G)

0.8

IDS Cost Factor (IC )

1

Budget/Target Cost (τC )

3

Initial Weight (α )

0.4

Learning Rate (LR )

10

Decay Rate (DR )

0.3

(Figure 3.4b), Optimism has no prior information about the attacker. The Budget
(τC in Eqns. (3.2,3.15)) is the maximum number of servers deployed in CCO and the
average number of servers deployed in the elastic case. Since IDS cost factor (IC ) is
taken as 1, the deployment costs (Eq. (3.9)) are in units of the number of deployed
IDS.

Genetic Algorithm Settings
I use a binary version of a genetic algorithm with an initial population of 200
distinct placement vectors (IP ). The elite count is 5% of the population, and the
adaptive feasible mutation function is used for both the CCO and BVO approaches
that stochastically mutates IP . The crossover function uses intermediate values that
are selected stochastically but weighted by the performance of the population. The
GA terminates when there is no appreciable improvement in the objective function
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(i.e., < 10−4 ) for 8 generations. I observe the runtime of Optimism to scale linearly
with the number of servers.

Performance Metrics
I utilize the beneﬁt (fB ) deﬁned in Eq. (3.4), as the performance metric as it
represents the probability that the attacker does not reach the crown jewel. In the case
of a dynamic system test (Figures. 3.5a, 3.5b, 3.7b,3.9), I utilize a stochastic process
to sample the success/failure outcome of the attacker. For a given random seed, I run
multiple trials. For each trial, I use a random sample to determine if an individual
server is compromised depending on the quality of IDS (IQ ) at that server and through
a chain of steps, the attacker is considered successful if she reaches any crown jewel.
Each seed randomizes the attacker’s path and the IDS alert generation. For example,
if with seed S1, I run 100 trials and in none of them the crown jewel is reached, then
the beneﬁt is 1. If however, with seed S2, I were to run 100 trials but the crown jewel is
reached on the 10th trial, then the beneﬁt is 0.1. The overall performance metric is the
average beneﬁt across all the random seeds. Note that CCO-Static denoted as CCO-S
and BVO-Static denoted as BVO-S are static system tests without online learning
(or dynamic IDS movement) and elastic modules whereas CCO-Dynamic denoted
as CCO-D has online learning module but does not support elasticity and BVODynamic with Elasticity denoted as BVO-DE supports both dynamic IDS movement
and elasticity.

Prior Work Comparison
I compare Optimism to Monitor-DSN16 [40] that uses a quantitative approach to
optimize a function of coverage and conﬁdence that results in static IDS placement.
I map their work to Optimism’s CCO-Static method where the cost IC is a function
of CPU, RAM, Network, etc., equivalent to fC , and their coverage and conﬁdence
values are equivalent to fB with uniform initial edge weights (EWAI (i, j) = 1 ∀ i, j
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(a) Multiple Deployment Costs

(b) Multiple Crown Jewels

Fig. 3.3.: The performance of Optimism’s cost constrained optimization-static
(CCO-S) is compared to a random and optimal IDS placement approach. CCO-S
matches the optimal performance for the entire range of deployment costs and significantly outperforms the random placement

in G). Monitor-DSN16 relies on attack graphs to decompose overall quality into an
attack vector space coverage while my approach takes the IDS quality as an input,
so I use the same IQ as Optimism for calculating fB , and the other parameter values
are unchanged as in Table 3.1.

3.7.2

Experiment 1: Performance of Optimism in Static Environment

This experiment demonstrates that the CCO-Static (CCO-S) is consistently tied
with the optimal performance through the entire range of deployment costs and signiﬁcantly outperforms the random IDS placement. The optimal performance is determined by placing the budgeted IDS at the best possible locations that gives maximum
beneﬁt, which is obtained through exhaustive searching. Thus, even though GA gives
no guarantee of optimality, I ﬁnd that in practice it achieves performance comparable
to the optimal for medium sized networks of as many as 15 servers.
In this experiment, the random placement approach is simulated by considering
all the possible placements of IDS and then selecting a mean case performance. Fig-
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ure 3.3a shows that CCO-S reaches its maximum performance (i.e., close to 1) at a
deployment cost of only 50% of the complete-coverage cost and it outperforms the
random placement by 5-20% for relative costs of 20-50%. Also shown in Figure 3.3a is
the performance of BVO for static case (BVO-S) with diﬀerent α values that control
the relative importance of beneﬁt to cost where selecting a lower alpha favors beneﬁt
more. BVO-S maximizes the beneﬁt to cost ratio since the beneﬁt of BVO-S for
α = 0.5 identiﬁes the knee of the CCO-S curve.
I also evaluate the performance of Optimism against the random and optimal
case for multiple crown jewels, as shown in Figure 3.3b. The experiment is evaluated
for diﬀerent numbers of crown jewels present at diﬀerent locations in the network.
Optimism matches the optimal performance and outperforms the random placement
since more crown jewels makes it even more diﬃcult for random placement to stop
the attacker, motivating my systematic approach.

(a) IDS Quality

(b) Attacker’s Path

Fig. 3.4.: The performance of Optimism’s cost constrained optimization static (CCOS) is shown with respect to the defender’s knowledge about the IDS quality and
attacker’s path. For the IDS quality, random noise is added to IQ by σ. For the
attacker path, the edge weights EWA are more closely aligned with the prior information about the attacker. One conﬁguration (”None”) means defender has no prior
knowledge about the attacker and this performs comparably to the higher knowledge
conﬁgurations for moderate to high budgets.
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Figure 3.4a shows the sensitivity of Optimism to the IDS quality measure. In this
experiment, the defender’s knowledge on the IDS quality is made more inaccurate by
adding noise to the IDS quality as IQ0 = IQ + σ · U (−0.5, 0.5), where U is the uniform
distribution and higher values of σ indicate less accurate knowledge. The result shows
that Optimism has only a mild sensitivity to the IDS quality accuracy especially at
moderate to high budgets (4 to 7) due to the high levels of redundancy in the IDS
placement which absorbs the variance in individual IDS qualities. This redundancy
is lost and the variance becomes more impactful for low budgets.
In the experiment shown in Figure 3.4b, I explore the impact of a priori information of attack path on Optimism. I consider a single attacker following a particular
attack path, which is known with varying accuracy to the defender. Here, conﬁguration “none” means the defender has no information about the attacker and uses
a uniform edge weight, “some” means the defender suspects the attack path and
weights its probability at 60% by biasing the EWA , “additional” is an 80% bias, and
“perfect” has a 100% bias toward the attacker’s path, where bias is the closeness of
EWA to the actual. The key take away is that Optimism with no information about
the attacker consistently maintains 94.7% of maximum beneﬁt achieved from perfect
knowledge averaged across all the budgets. Note the maximum beneﬁt achieved is
not 100% because each IDS has imperfect quality. For the “inaccurate” case, the
defender is biased 20% away from the attacker’s path, e.g., the defender thinks the
attacker is coming from somewhere else. This result veriﬁes the ability of the edge
weight system to utilize a priori information about attacks in the system.

3.7.3

Experiment 2: Performance of Optimism with Online Learning in
Dynamic Environment

This experiment compares the performance of Optimism for diﬀerent learning
strategies described in Section 3.4.5 with the state of the art placement strategy
(Monitor-DSN16) for single and two attacker cases. Note that CCO-D does have
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dynamism but no elasticity, i.e., it can respond to changing attack paths, but cannot
grow the number of IDS in response to increased alerts. The decay rate (DR) is set
to zero. Figure 3.5a shows that the distance-based approach is the most successful
in mitigating the attacker as it favors placing IDS nearer to the alert node. The
predecessor and path-based perform nearly the same, but for systems with many paths
with common edges predecessor-based will perform worse because it throws away
non-local information. For the remaining experiments, the distance-based approach
is used.
From Figure 3.5a, the distance based CCO-D with online learning system performs 13.8% more than the state of the art prior work (Monitor-DSN16) in terms of
beneﬁt for a budget of 3. Overall, the Optimism’s distance based CCO-D outperforms Monitor-DSN16 due to the online learning system that supports dynamic IDS
movement depending on the attack path. Figure 3.5b compares the distance based
CCO-D with Monitor-DSN16 for two attackers using 2 diﬀerent attack paths simultaneously to reach the crown jewel. As the budget increases, the increase in beneﬁts
of dynamic placement are reduced as most nodes are covered already.

(a) One Attacker

(b) Two Attackers

Fig. 3.5.: The performance of Monitor-DSN16 and CCO-Dynamic is shown with
respect to the budget for diﬀerent learning strategies. CCO-Dynamic with distance
based approach is used for two attacker case.
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Next I evaluate the impact of the learning rate and decay rate on the same system with the distance-based method in use. These two parameters are provided by
the network administrator based on the assumptions about the attacker. From Figure 3.6a, higher decay rates favor the a priori, uniform chance case which results in
solutions that are less ﬁtted to the attacker. At t=30, the attacker changes paths, and
the system must learn about this new attack path. With a high decay rate, the new
path is discovered very quickly while for the lower decay rates it takes much longer to
“forget” about the previous attack path. In this experiment, the intermediate rates
are the most robust having midpoint-to-high performance. Defenders that beneﬁt
from isolating attack paths quickly should use a lower decay rate while those wanting
less dynamic placements should use a higher rate.

(a) Decay Rate

(b) Learning Rate

Fig. 3.6.: Eﬀect of learning and decaying rate on performance of distance based
CCO-D when the attacker changes paths suddenly at t=30.

The learning rate, a compliment to the decay rate, is shown in Figure 3.6b. In
this case, high learning rates favor quickly ﬁtting to the attacker. Since there is only
one attacker, the highest rates perform quite well. One caveat is after the attack
transient, the systems with a lower learning rate are more neutrally positioned and
can adapt more quickly in the initial phases to the new attacker path. The lowest
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learning rates are not suﬃcient to trigger dynamic placements, hence the performance
plateaus.

3.7.4

Experiment 3: Performance of Optimism with Elasticity

Here I test Optimism’s elasticity property. First I tune the feedback controller [53]
by setting Ki = 0 and sweeping through diﬀerent values of Kp to ﬁnd the Kp at which
the output of the feedback controller (# IDS deployed) has stable oscillations around
τC . I choose a gain of Kp = 0.01 since it gets us close to the target cost (5 here) and
makes the system agile enough to respond to new alerts. Next I vary Ki to ﬁnd the
optimal value as shown in Figure 3.7a. After the alert stops at t = 45, the integral
term becomes the dominant feedback process, and the number of deployed servers is
returned to 3 to recover the cost back to the target of 5. In these cases too large of
a Ki will prevent any elastic growth while too small of a Ki will cause the system to
overshoot budget targets. I use a value of Ki = 0.005 as it balances these needs.
Finally in Figure 3.7b I show the performance of the elastic BVO setup (BVODE) over CCO-D and Monitor-DSN16. On an average across the budgets, BVO-DE
outperforms the non-elastic setup (CCO-D) by 28.9% and Monitor-DSN16 by 65.8%
in terms of attacker’s probability of success. The BVO-DE gains are more pronounced
for lower budgets where there is more headroom for elastic growth.

3.7.5

Experiment 4: Testbed Implementation

Finally I evaluate Optimism in a testbed environment. As shown in Figure 3.8, I
use a VMWare ESXi hypervisor to deploy the servers and IDS as VMs with a Pica8
OpenFlow-capable switch [56] and an ONOS SDN controller [58] to carryout a smallscale experiment. First I evaluate the impact of Optimism’s re-deployment speed on
the performance of the BVO-DE. Figure 3.9 shows the performance degradation of
Optimism’s BVO-DE whenever multiple alerts are received before a new IDS can be
deployed (due to the delay involved in updating the ﬂow rules in OpenFlow switches
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(a) Varying Ki , Kp = 0.01

(b) Performance with Kp = 0.01, Ki = 0.005

Fig. 3.7.: (a) Response Characteristics of Feedback Controller for target cost τC =5;
(b) Performance of BVO-Dynamic with elastic system (BVO-DE).

Time
Placement Vector Generation 34.3 s
Alert Notiﬁcation

7.5 ms

Hot IDS Insertion

6 ms

Warm IDS Insertion

6.15 s

Cold IDS Insertion

183 s

Table 3.2.: Testbed Timing

and optionally, spinning up a VM to run the IDS). When 10 alerts are received before
the reconﬁguration completes, due to the slow redeployment speed of the IDS, the
BVO-DE performance matches the CCO-D performance since it eﬀectively becomes
inelastic.
Next I test the mechanisms behind Optimism in the testbed with timing information shown in Table 3.2. There are three events that impact the operation of
Optimism. First, the time for moving an already running IDS is the time it takes
to install a new rule into the Pica8 switch by the ONOS controller–a “hot” insertion.
This plus the alert notiﬁcation time is the minimum response time of CCO-D after
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Fig. 3.8.: SDN Testbed setup.

the placement vector is generated (13.5 ms). Second is the time for starting a new
IDS on a VM that was in a hibernation state and needs to be woken up–a “warm”
insertion. This is the delay that an elastic strategy (BVO-DE) will encounter when
increasing the number of IDS. This is 3 orders of magnitude slower than the hot
case. Finally, the most expensive is the “cold” insertion where the VM needs to be
instantiated by the hypervisor from a template and then the IDS is executed on it.
This time is dominated by the time to load up the VM image of 50 GB from disk.
The time that it takes for the GA running at the SDN controller to compute the IDS
placement vector after receiving the alert information is 34.3 s. However, the multiple
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Fig. 3.9.: The performance of Optimism’s BVO-DE is shown with respect to the
transient time period, with testbed timing information shown in the table 3.2.

evaluations done by GA can be trivially parallelized to get this time down to 172 ms
(dividing by the population size of 200 evaluations).

3.8

Conclusion
Optimism provides network administrators with a cost-eﬀective method for pro-

tecting against multi-stage attacks. By using the network structure and IDS quality
as input, Optimism solves a constrained optimization problem that gives the nearoptimal IDS placement. There are two variants—CCO, which respects a hard upper
bound on the deployment cost, and BVO, which allows for elastic growth in the number of IDS during intense alerts. I provide an online learning module that incorporates
alert information and network ﬂow changes to better defend against attacks by relocating IDS using SDN and NFV functionalities. On an average across the range of
deployment costs, Optimism improves upon the state-of-the-art by 65.8% and consistently maintains 94.7% of maximum beneﬁt achieved from perfect knowledge about
the attacker.
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4. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
4.1

Conclusion
A major security threat to multi-layer distributed systems is multi-stage attacks

(MSA), where an attacker compromises the outward facing services and then penetrates into deeper services in a stepping stone manner, by using elevated privilege at
each prior system component. It is diﬃcult to counter MSA due to the mixing of
multiple network ﬂows at the intermediate servers. In Chapter 2, this thesis describes
Tophat to solve the problem of attribution and counter the MSA. Tophat utilize
moving target defense implemented on SDN infrastructure to isolate the attacker
from the legitimate clients. Tophat provides uniform assignment variant for faster
convergence and low risk isolation variant for improving client connectivity during
attack identiﬁcation. The evaluation results show that Tophat can identify a single
attacker in a system of 1000 clients and 3 servers at the entry layer in 6 shuﬄes or
1000 seconds. This chapter also demonstrates that Tophat can retain the connectivity of majority of the legitimate clients after 3-4 shuﬄes while the attacker is still
identiﬁed.
The next problem that this thesis addresses is optimizing the IDS placement to
counter MSA. Due to the limited resources, it is not feasible to place IDS in all the
servers to stop the multi-stage attacks. Chapter 3 describes Optimism to determine
the near-optimal IDS placements that can maximize the network protection and minimize the deployment costs. Optimism comes with two optimization variants namely
cost constrained optimization (CCO) which maximizes the beneﬁt given a budget
and best value optimization (BVO) that allows for elastic growth in the number of
IDS during intense alerts. The evaluation results shows that averaged across all the
deployment costs, Optimism reduces the attacker’s probability of success by 65.8%
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as compared to the state of the art (Monitor-DSN18) due to the online learning and
elastic control modules. The ﬁnal experiment on this chapter demonstrates the viability of Optimism in the SDN testbed and shows that it can adapt to alert information
with new deployments in as small as 13.5 ms.
In summary, this thesis has laid the groundwork for mitigating multi-stage attacks
by leveraging the beneﬁts of SDN combined with NFV. Overall, Network administrators can use Tophat combined with Optimism to determine the optimal IDS
placements in mitigating multi-stage attacks.

4.2

Future Work
This section describes the future directions for additional work.

4.2.1

Tophat Integration with Optimism

This thesis describes Tophat to attribute the multi-stage attacks to a single external source and discusses about Optimism to determine the optimal IDS placement
to minimize the probability of attacker reaching the crown jewel undetected. However, it is important to combine the agile IDS optimization of Optimism with the
attribution goals of Tophat since there is an interdependence complexity between
the placement of IDS and detection of the attacker. An additional module can be
developed to combine the probability of identifying the attacker as in Tophat and
probability of attacker reaching the crown jewel as in Optimism into a single objective
function and then use genetic algorithm to ﬁnd the agreement point.

4.2.2

Controller scaling and consistency

Both the proposed systems work with the assumption of single SDN controller
that leads to scalability issues. The problem of scaling to large number of assets and
multiple SDN controllers can be solved by incorporating stronger consistency models
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for some routing rules, and lazy consistency models for others, based on security
analysis of the response algorithms in the distributed controllers. This will also drive
the NFV placement of some security functionality, so that only after determining
that some traﬃc is not sensitive and that no business policy is being violated, will
it be allowed to leave the premises. This thrust will allow secure operation of SDNbased environments, even where multiple controllers and coordination among them
are involved. The proposed protocol and its rigorous security analysis will ensure that
some traﬃc cannot travel over an insecure link, or the traﬃc cannot travel over links
that are prohibited from a policy standpoint, even transiently in the face of network
reconﬁguration.

4.2.3

Inter-organizational privacy-preserving alert exchange

This thrust targets the situation that protecting the enterprise environment relies on some information about network ﬂows that are passing through some other
enterprise. Multi-stage attacks can span many such external interfaces across enterprise boundaries and with today’s technology, attack attribution, diﬃcult as it is for
a single enterprise, becomes impossible in this scenario. This problem can be solved
by allowing sharing of alert information among enterprises, suﬃcient for the purpose
of attribution of suspicious network ﬂows, where attribution occurs according to my
current solution. The alert information will be sanitized automatically for preserving the private information of a given enterprise, while having enough information
content for Tophat s attribution protocol.

REFERENCES

77

REFERENCES

[1] D. M. Nessett and W. P. Sherer, “Multilayer ﬁrewall system,” Oct. 19 1999, uS
Patent 5,968,176.
[2] S. Ioannidis, A. D. Keromytis, S. M. Bellovin, and J. M. Smith, “Implementing
a distributed ﬁrewall,” in Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Computer
and communications security. ACM, 2000, pp. 190–199.
[3] T. Escamilla, Intrusion detection: network security beyond the ﬁrewall.
Wiley, 1998.

John

[4] M. Roesch et al., “Snort: Lightweight intrusion detection for networks.” in Lisa,
vol. 99, no. 1, 1999, pp. 229–238.
[5] M. Sun and T. Chen, “Network intrusion detection system,” Sep. 30 2010, uS
Patent App. 12/411,916.
[6] Snort intrusion prevention system. [Online]. Available: https://www.snort.org/
[7] Bro network security monitor. [Online]. Available: https://www.bro.org/
[8] D. D. Clark and S. Landau, “Untangling attribution,” Harv. Nat’l Sec. J., vol. 2,
p. 323, 2011.
[9] A. Cook, A. Nicholson, H. Janicke, L. A. Maglaras, and R. Smith, “Attribution
of cyber attacks on industrial control systems.”
[10] L. A. Maglaras, J. Jiang, and T. J. Cruz, “Combining ensemble methods and
social network metrics for improving accuracy of ocsvm on intrusion detection in
scada systems,” Journal of Information Security and Applications, vol. 30, pp.
15–26, 2016.
[11] A. Cook, M. Robinson, M. A. Ferrag, L. A. Maglaras, Y. He, K. Jones, and
H. Janicke, “Internet of cloud: Security and privacy issues,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1711.00525, 2017.
[12] Y. Zhu and R. Bettati, “Unmixing mix traﬃc,” in International Workshop on
Privacy Enhancing Technologies. Springer, 2005, pp. 110–127.
[13] W. T. Strayer, C. E. Jones, B. I. Schwartz, J. Mikkelson, and C. Livadas, “Architecture for multi-stage network attack traceback,” in Local Computer Networks,
2005. 30th Anniversary. The IEEE Conference on. IEEE, 2005, pp. 8–pp.
[14] G. Modelo-Howard, J. Sweval, and S. Bagchi, “Secure conﬁguration of intrusion
detection sensors for changing enterprise systems,” in International Conference
on Security and Privacy in Communication Systems (SecureComm). Springer,
2011, pp. 39–58.

78
[15] F. Alserhani, M. Akhlaq, I. U. Awan, A. J. Cullen, and P. Mirchandani, “Mars:
multi-stage attack recognition system,” in Advanced Information Networking and
Applications (AINA), 2010 24th IEEE International Conference on. IEEE,
2010, pp. 753–759.
[16] J. Dawkins and J. Hale, “A systematic approach to multi-stage network attack
analysis,” in Information Assurance Workshop, 2004. Proceedings. Second IEEE
International. IEEE, 2004, pp. 48–56.
[17] S. Savage, D. Wetherall, A. Karlin, and T. Anderson, “Practical network support
for ip traceback,” in ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, vol.
30-4. ACM, 2000, pp. 295–306.
[18] T. Baba and S. Matsuda, “Tracing network attacks to their sources,” IEEE
Internet Computing, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 20–26, 2002.
[19] Z. Xu, Z. Wu, Z. Li, K. Jee, J. Rhee, X. Xiao, F. Xu, H. Wang, and G. Jiang,
“High ﬁdelity data reduction for big data security dependency analyses,” in
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. ACM, 2016, pp. 504–516.
[20] B. H. Sigelman, L. A. Barroso, M. Burrows, P. Stephenson, M. Plakal, D. Beaver,
S. Jaspan, and C. Shanbhag, “Dapper, a large-scale distributed systems tracing
infrastructure.”
[21] G. Modelo-Howard, S. Bagchi, and G. Lebanon, “Determining placement of intrusion detectors for a distributed application through bayesian network modeling,” in International Workshop on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection.
Springer, 2008, pp. 271–290.
[22] D. C. MacFarland and C. A. Shue, “The sdn shuﬄe: creating a moving-target
defense using host-based software-deﬁned networking,” in Proceedings of the Second ACM Workshop on Moving Target Defense. ACM, 2015, pp. 37–41.
[23] P. Kampanakis, H. Perros, and T. Beyene, “Sdn-based solutions for moving target defense network protection,” in A World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia
Networks (WoWMoM), 2014 IEEE 15th International Symposium on. IEEE,
2014, pp. 1–6.
[24] N. McKeown, “Software-deﬁned networking,” INFOCOM keynote talk, vol. 17,
no. 2, pp. 30–32, 2009.
[25] R. Wang, D. Butnariu, J. Rexford et al., “Openﬂow-based server load balancing
gone wild.” Hot-ICE, vol. 11, pp. 12–12, 2011.
[26] N. Feamster, J. Rexford, and E. Zegura, “The road to sdn: an intellectual history of programmable networks,” ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication
Review, vol. 44, no. 2, pp. 87–98, 2014.
[27] S. Noel, E. Robertson, and S. Jajodia, “Correlating intrusion events and building
attack scenarios through attack graph distances,” in Computer Security Applications Conference, 2004. 20th Annual. IEEE, 2004, pp. 350–359.

79
[28] J. Medved, R. Varga, A. Tkacik, and K. Gray, “Opendaylight: Towards a modeldriven sdn controller architecture,” in A World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks (WoWMoM), 2014 IEEE 15th International Symposium on.
IEEE, 2014, pp. 1–6.
[29] J. H. Jafarian, E. Al-Shaer, and Q. Duan, “Openﬂow random host mutation:
transparent moving target defense using software deﬁned networking,” in Proceedings of the ﬁrst workshop on Hot topics in software deﬁned networks. ACM,
2012, pp. 127–132.
[30] F. Sultan, K. Srinivasan, D. Iyer, and L. Iftode, “Migratory tcp: Connection
migration for service continuity in the internet,” in Distributed Computing Systems, 2002. Proceedings. 22nd International Conference on. IEEE, 2002, pp.
469–470.
[31] A. Panasyuk, A. Kramer, B. J. Pedersen, D. S. Stone, and T. Treder, “Systems
and methods for maintaining a session between a client and host service,” Mar. 10
2009, uS Patent 7,502,726.
[32] K. Srinivasan and T. C. Bisson, “Seamless takeover of a stateful protocol session
in a virtual machine environment,” Mar. 21 2017, uS Patent 9,600,315.
[33] M. Mao and M. Humphrey, “A performance study on the vm startup time in the
cloud,” in Cloud Computing (CLOUD), 2012 IEEE 5th International Conference
on. IEEE, 2012, pp. 423–430.
[34] D. D. Clark and S. Landau, “The problem isn’t attribution: it’s multi-stage
attacks,” in Proceedings of the Re-architecting the Internet Workshop. ACM,
2010, p. 11.
[35] H.-J. Liao, C.-H. R. Lin, Y.-C. Lin, and K.-Y. Tung, “Intrusion detection system: A comprehensive review,” Journal of Network and Computer Applications,
vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 16–24, 2013.
[36] P. Garcia-Teodoro, J. Diaz-Verdejo, G. Maciá-Fernández, and E. Vázquez,
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